As discussed in an earlier Legal Update,1 substantial uncertainty exists over whether companies in bankruptcy are eligible for loans under the Paycheck Protection Program, or PPP, which was established by the CARES Act to support small businesses by offering SBA-guaranteed loans on advantageous terms. Several recent bankruptcy court decisions underscore this uncertainty.
As courts across the country deal with scaled back operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic, bankruptcy courts in New Jersey and Delaware have issued novel orders to address the impact of the virus on certain debtors. Last month, debtors in the chapter 11 bankruptcy cases of Modell’s Sporting Goods, Inc. and CraftWorks Parent, LLC each sought and obtained court orders suspending certain case activity which, for all intents and purposes “mothballed” the cases for a certain period of time.
On December 19, 2019, the Second Circuit held that appellants’ state law constructive fraudulent transfer claims were preempted by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbors that exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for
On February 25, 2020, the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation[1] struck down a judicial federal common law rule—known as the Bob Richards rule—that is used by courts to allocate tax refunds among members of a corporate affiliated group where the group does not have a written tax sharing agreement in place, or, at least in some federal Circuits, where an agreement fails to allocate the refunds unambiguously.
On January 14, 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a decision resolving the question of whether a motion for relief from the automatic stay constitutes a discrete dispute within the bankruptcy that creates a basis for a final appealable ruling, or whether it simply is a controversy that is part of the broader Chapter 11 case, such that appeals would not need to be taken until the conclusion of the Chapter 11 case.
Prepayment premiums (also referred to as make-whole premiums) are a common feature in loan documents, allowing lenders to recover a lump-sum amount if a borrower pays off loan obligations prior to maturity, effectively compensating lenders for yield that they would have otherwise received absent prepayment. As a result of the widespread use of such provisions, three circuit courts of appeal – the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Second, Third and Fifth Circuit – have recently had to address the enforceability of prepayment provisions in bankruptcy.
The oil and gas industry in the United States is highly dependent upon an intricate set of agreements that allow oil and gas to be gathered from privately owned land. Historically, the dedication language in oil and gas gathering agreements — through which the rights to the oil or gas in specified land are dedicated — was viewed as being a covenant that ran with the land. That view was put to the test during the wave of oil and gas exploration company bankruptcies that began in 2014.
In recent weeks, the dispute in Windstream’s bankruptcy between Windstream and its REIT spinoff Uniti Group over the lease transaction that ultimately led to Windstream’s chapter 11 bankruptcy has continued to escalate with Windstream filing an adversary complaint against Uniti. In its complaint, Windstream seeks to recharacterize the lease as a disguised financing alleging that the lease resulted in a long-term transfer of billions of dollars to Uniti to the detriment of Windstream’s creditors.
On April 23, 2019, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in fraudulent transfer litigation arising out of the 2007 leveraged buyout of the Tribune Company,1 ruled on one of the significant issues left unresolved by the US Supreme Court in its Merit Management decision last year.
On February 25, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision holding that a trustee is not barred by either the presumption against extraterritoriality or by international comity principles from recovering property from a foreign subsequent transferee that received the property from a foreign initial transferee.