On April 23, 2019, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in fraudulent transfer litigation arising out of the 2007 leveraged buyout of the Tribune Company,1 ruled on one of the significant issues left unresolved by the US Supreme Court in its Merit Management decision last year.
Intercreditor agreements between secured creditors are intended to limit the potential for litigation and result in predictable commercial outcomes with respect to recoveries from collateral in enforcement actions and bankruptcies. Despite the extensive drafting efforts of sophisticated counsel to eliminate ambiguities in these agreements, the interpretation of intercreditor agreements has been the subject of substantial bankruptcy litigation.
Intercreditor agreements--contracts that lay out the respective rights, obligations and priorities of different classes of creditors--play an increasingly important role in corporate finance in light of the continued prevalence of complex capital structures involving various levels of debt. When a company encounters financial difficulties, intercreditor agreements become all the more important, as competing classes of creditors seek to maximize their share of the company's limited assets.
On January 17, 2017, in a long-awaited decision in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp.,1 the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Section 316 of the Trust Indenture Act ("TIA") does not prohibit an out of court restructuring of corporate bonds so long as an indenture's core payment terms are left intact.
In a June 3, 2016 decision1 , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.
In a blow to the Lehman Chapter 11 estates, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held on September 16, 2015 that Intel Corporation’s Loss calculation resulting from a failed transaction under an ISDA Master Agreement was appropriate.1 The decision is significant both because of the dearth of judicial interpretation of the ISDA mechanics regarding the calculation of early termination amounts, and because it affirms the general market understanding that a non-defaulting party has broad discretion in calculating “Loss,” so long as its
On December 5, 2013, Judge Steven Rhodes of the US Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the city of Detroit had satisfied the five expressly delineated eligibility requirements for filing under Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code1 and so could proceed with its bankruptcy case.