The Supreme Court handed down its decision yesterday on the combined appeals of Nortel GmbH (In Administration) ("Nortel") and Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) ("Lehman Brothers") (together, the "Appellants") against the Pensions Regulator ("tPR").

Nearly three years after the High Court decision on the case of BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail UK 2007 – 3BL PLC and others was handed down, the case has run its course in the Supreme Court. The case, which considers the correct interpretation of the balance-sheet insolvency test in section 123(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986, is of importance to insolvency practitioners, financial institutions, legal advisers, company directors and companies.  

Court of Appeal decision  

Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(10) provides that in order for a plan proponent to “cram down” - i.e., force acceptance of - a plan of reorganization on a dissenting class of creditors, at least one impaired class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. Because a plan is often not accepted by all classes entitled to vote, the ability to procure at least one impaired, accepting class in order to cram down a dissenting class is essential in achieving plan confirmation.

The Pensions Regulator (the “Regulator”) has published a statement setting out its approach to the issuing of financial support directions (“FSDs”) in insolvency situations. The statement is designed to calm fears following the decision in the joined Nortel and Lehman cases that the “super priority” of FSDs could have a negative impact on the corporate rescue and lending industries.

Background

In what it described as “an easy decision,” the U.S. Supreme Court issued its eagerly anticipated decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC et al. v. Amalgamated Bank¹ on May 29, 2012.

Technological innovation has changed the landscape of domestic natural gas production from shortage to surplus. The result: a glut of natural gas and historically low prices. While many producers have successfully hedged against this risk to date, as older hedges roll off, many companies are unable to obtain replacement hedges at attractive prices. Some have even resorted to monetizing their in-the-money hedges to raise capital today (and borrowing against the future).

Introduction

Hildyard J’s recent sanctioning of the scheme of arrangement proposed by PrimaCom Holding GmbH (‘’PrimaCom’’), a German incorporated company whose creditors were domiciled outside of the UK, has reaffirmed the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the English courts in respect of schemes of arrangement and confirmed their status as a useful instrument for foreign companies looking to restructure¹.  

The process

Rejection of a contract in bankruptcy may not always accomplish a debtor’s goal to shed ongoing contractual obligations and liabilities, especially when dealing with employee benefit plans. On October 13, 2011, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals highlighted this issue in its opinion in Evans v. Sterling Chemicals, Inc.¹ regarding the treatment of a pre-bankruptcy asset purchase agreement which contained a provision addressing the debtor-acquiror’s post-closing ERISA retiree benefit plan obligations to its new employees resulting from the transaction.

The Court of Appeal has confirmed that the costs of complying with Financial Support Directions (“FSDs”) proposed to be issued to certain Nortel and Lehman companies by the Pensions Regulator (“TPR”) qualify as “super priority” administration expenses, payable in priority to unsecured creditors, floating charge holders and the administrators’ own fees.

The question

Bankruptcy Judge Michael Lynn of the Northern District of Texas recently issued a noteworthy opinion in In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P. that addresses two important Chapter 11 confirmation issues. Judge Lynn determined that a plan that artificially impaired a class of claims in order to meet the requirements of section 1129(a)(10) had not been proposed in bad faith and did not violate the requirements of section 1129(a). In his ruling, Judge Lynn also applied the Supreme Court’s cram-down “interest”1 rate teachings in Till v.