Both the First Energy Solutions and PG&E bankruptcies have seen proceedings regarding power purchase and similar agreements (PPAs) that raise this question.
Background
Contracts often contain provisions that enable a party to terminate or modify the contract based on the other party's bankruptcy filing, insolvency or deteriorating financial condition. In general, the Bankruptcy Code renders these types of provisions (sometimes referred to as "ipso facto" clauses) ineffective. Specifically, under section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added):
After months of speculation, it is now official : PG&E (both the parent, PG&E Corporation, and its subsidiary, Pacific Gas & Electric Company), having faced extraordinary challenges relating to catastrophic wildfires in 2017 and 2018, has announced that a voluntary bankruptcy filing “is appropriate, necessary and in the best interests of all stakeholders, including wildfire claimants, PG&E’s other creditors and shareholders, and is ultimately the only viable option to restore PG&E’s financial stability to fund ongoing operations and provide safe service to customers.” As
Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., No. 16-784 (2018)
Arthur C. Clarke famously observed: “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.” Our regulatory, legislative, and judicial systems illustrate this principle whenever new technology exceeds the limits of our existing legal framework and collective legal imagination. Cryptocurrency, such as bitcoin, has proven particularly “magical” in the existing framework of bankruptcy law, which has not yet determined quite what bitcoin is—a currency, an intangible asset, a commodity contract, or something else entirely.
Arthur C. Clarke famously observed: “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.” Our regulatory, legislative, and judicial systems illustrate this principle whenever new technology exceeds the limits of our existing legal framework and collective legal imagination. Cryptocurrency, such as bitcoin, has proven particularly “magical” in the existing framework of bankruptcy law, which has not yet determined quite what bitcoin is—a currency, an intangible asset, a commodity contract, or something else entirely.
As we have noted in another post, Non-Final Finality: Does One Interlocutory Issue Resolved in a Bankruptcy Court Order Render All Issues Addressed in the Order Non-Appealable?, not all orders in bankruptcy cases are immediately appealable as a matter of right. Only those orders deemed sufficiently “final” may be appealed without additional court authorization.
While significant energy here at the Bankruptcy Cave is devoted to substantive bankruptcy matters, not all aspects of a general insolvency practice are always fun and litigation. Oftentimes insolvency lawyers add the most value by helping clients avoid a bankruptcy filing, or by successfully resolving a case through a consensual transactional restructuring.
As the Supreme Court recently reminded us in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, not all orders in bankruptcy cases are immediately appealable as a matter of right. Only those orders deemed sufficiently “final” may be appealed without leave under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).
Individual debtors with old tax debts relating to late-filed tax returns may be surprised to find that those tax debts may not be dischargeable under section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code due to the lateness of the tax filing. There is a current Circuit split regarding whether a late tax filing constitutes a “return” at all, which is critical to the dischargeability inquiry. The Ninth Circuit weighed in last week in In re Smith, 2016 WL 3749156 (9th Cir. July 13, 2016), further cementing the split.
A recent Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Franklin v. McHugh, 2015 WL 6602023 (2d Cir. 2015), illustrates the dire consequences of failing to comply fully with all electronic filing requirements for a notice of appeal.