Both the First Energy Solutions and PG&E bankruptcies have seen proceedings regarding power purchase and similar agreements (PPAs) that raise this question.
Background
Contracts often contain provisions that enable a party to terminate or modify the contract based on the other party's bankruptcy filing, insolvency or deteriorating financial condition. In general, the Bankruptcy Code renders these types of provisions (sometimes referred to as "ipso facto" clauses) ineffective. Specifically, under section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added):
After months of speculation, it is now official : PG&E (both the parent, PG&E Corporation, and its subsidiary, Pacific Gas & Electric Company), having faced extraordinary challenges relating to catastrophic wildfires in 2017 and 2018, has announced that a voluntary bankruptcy filing “is appropriate, necessary and in the best interests of all stakeholders, including wildfire claimants, PG&E’s other creditors and shareholders, and is ultimately the only viable option to restore PG&E’s financial stability to fund ongoing operations and provide safe service to customers.” As
Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., No. 16-784 (2018)
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on May 4, 2015, affirmed U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain’s decision confirming the reorganization plan for Momentive Performance Materials Inc. and its affiliated debtors.1 The Bankruptcy Court’s decision was controversial because it forced the debtors’ senior secured creditors to accept new secured notes bearing interest at below- market rates.
On December 5, 2013, Judge Steven Rhodes of the US Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the city of Detroit had satisfied the five expressly delineated eligibility requirements for filing under Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code1 and so could proceed with its bankruptcy case.
On Sept. 12, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision to deny payment of a make-whole premium (the “Make-Whole Amount”) to bondholders under three separate indentures (the “Indentures”) based on the plain language of those agreements. U.S. Bank Trust Nat’l Ass’n v. AMR Corp. et al. (In re AMR Corp.), __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 4840474 (2d Cir. Sept. 12, 2013) (“In re AMR Corp. II”).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on Feb. 14, 2013, held that an insider of a Chapter 11 partnership debtor cannot avoid the “competition rule” in a new-value reorganization plan. The debtor’s equity owner arranged for his wife, also an “insider,” to contribute new value to obtain the equity of the reorganized debtor. In re Castleton Plaza, LP, — F.3d –––, 2013 WL 537269 at *1 (7th Cir., Feb. 14, 2013).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held on Aug. 3, 2012, that equitable considerations could not prevent a creditor's recouping amounts owed to it by a chapter 7 debtor. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 2012 WL 3139364, *4 (8th Cir. Aug. 3, 2012). Reversing the bankruptcy court and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP"), the Eighth Circuit explained that "once a party meets the same-transaction test . . . a court should not impose an additional 'balancing of the equities' requirement" on the doctrine of recoupment. Id.
On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Circuit Court”) issued an opinion in In re TOUSA, Inc.,1 in which it affirmed the original decision of the bankruptcy court and reversed the appellate decision of the district court. After a 13-day trial, the bankruptcy court had found that liens granted by certain TOUSA subsidiaries (the “Conveying Subsidiaries”) to secure new loans (the “New Term Loans”) incurred to pay off preexisting indebtedness to certain lenders (the “Transeastern Lenders”) were avoidable fraudulent transfers.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that a debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) lender had breached its financing agreement, barring its claim for commitment and funding fees from the DIP. Arlington LF, LLC v. Arlington Hospitality, Inc., No. 09-3560, 2011 WL 727981, *9 (7th Cir. March 3, 2011), aff’g No. 08 C 5098, 2011 WL 3055350 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2009). Although the DIP itself had also breached the agreement, that breach was not, in the court’s view, effective until after the lender had already “walked away.” Id. at *6.