Both the First Energy Solutions and PG&E bankruptcies have seen proceedings regarding power purchase and similar agreements (PPAs) that raise this question.

Background

Contracts often contain provisions that enable a party to terminate or modify the contract based on the other party's bankruptcy filing, insolvency or deteriorating financial condition. In general, the Bankruptcy Code renders these types of provisions (sometimes referred to as "ipso facto" clauses) ineffective. Specifically, under section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added):

After months of speculation, it is now official : PG&E (both the parent, PG&E Corporation, and its subsidiary, Pacific Gas & Electric Company), having faced extraordinary challenges relating to catastrophic wildfires in 2017 and 2018, has announced that a voluntary bankruptcy filing “is appropriate, necessary and in the best interests of all stakeholders, including wildfire claimants, PG&E’s other creditors and shareholders, and is ultimately the only viable option to restore PG&E’s financial stability to fund ongoing operations and provide safe service to customers.” As

Introduction

For more than a century, a creditor holding English law governed debt relied on the principle (known as the “rule in Gibbs ”) that a debt governed by English law cannot be discharged by a foreign insolvency proceeding, provided that the creditor does not submit to that proceeding.

Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., No. 16-784 (2018)

When any industry faces challenging times, thoughts turn to what might happen to those companies which are unable to maintain their solvency and service their existing debt.

The Supreme Court (unanimously dismissing the appeal in Trustees of Olympic Airlines SA Pension &Life Assurance Scheme v Olympic Airlines SA) has held that “economic activity” is central to the definition of “establishment” in the Insolvency Regulation¹.

On December 5, 2013, Judge Steven Rhodes of the US Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the city of Detroit had satisfied the five expressly delineated eligibility requirements for filing under Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code¹ and so could proceed with its bankruptcy case.

On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Circuit Court”) issued an opinion in In re TOUSA, Inc.,¹ in which it affirmed the original decision of the bankruptcy court and reversed the appellate decision of the district court. After a 13-day trial, the bankruptcy court had found that liens granted by certain TOUSA subsidiaries (the “Conveying Subsidiaries”) to secure new loans (the “New Term Loans”) incurred to pay off preexisting indebtedness to certain lenders (the “Transeastern Lenders”) were avoidable fraudulent transfers.

The Court has heard another case dealing with a defective appointment of administrators under paragraph 22 of Schedule B1 Insolvency Act 1986 (“Schedule B1”)¹. Following hot on the tail of a recent series of conflicting cases relating to defective appointments, the Court has held that:

In the much anticipated decision of Belmont Park Investments PTY Limited v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc [2011] UKSC 38 the Supreme Court has unanimously dismissed the appeal of Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc (“LBSF”) and in so doing provided clarification as to the scope and application of the anti-deprivation rule (the “Rule”).