Since the landmark decision in Re Solfire Pty Ltd (In Liq) (No. 2) [1999] 2 Qd R 182, the Queensland Supreme Court has often marched to its own tune when reviewing applications for insolvency practitioner remuneration and disbursements. In two related decisions arising from the insolvency of LM Investment Management and managed investment schemes of which it is responsible entity, the Court has now turned its attention to the controversies in this area over proportionality and access to trust assets with which its counterparts in New South Wales have grappled over the last 18 months.

In a series of recent decisions1, the Federal Court of Australia has held that section 588FL of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) operates such that any new security granted by a company in external administration2. that could only be perfected by registration on the Personal Property Securities Register (PPSR), and which is not the subject of an effective registration made before the appointment of the external administrator, will be ineffective3.

In a wide-reaching judgment concerning an appeal by Mighty River International in the administration of Mesa Minerals, the Western Australian Court of Appeal has recognised that a "holding" Deed of Company Arrangement (DOCA) is permissible under Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act.

The key points - Holding DOCAs as a flexible framework

The key points for insolvency and turnaround professionals to take from Mighty River International v. Hughes are:

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

Court of Appeal sets the record straight

The key point

On March 9, 2017, a full bench of the New South Wales Court of Appeal handed down a significant decision affecting approach to judicial review and approval of liquidator remuneration. Significantly, existing tension between decisions of different judges at first instance, and between NSW and Federal courts, has been resolved.

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.