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The Bankruptcy Code prohibits a chapter 13 debtor from modifying a mortgage lien on the debtor's principal residence. Even in situations in which a secured creditor fails to file a proof of claim or otherwise participate in the bankruptcy proceeding, the Bankruptcy Code allows a secured creditor's lien on a primary residence to pass through the bankruptcy unaffected. However, a recent decision from a bankruptcy court in Texas illustrates the risks to secured creditors of blind reliance on these statutory protections.

Yesterday in Canberra, a significant step forward for Australian insolvency law reform was taken: Parliament passed the much anticipated "safe harbor" for directors in relation to insolvent trading liability and moratorium on reliance by solvent counterparties on “ipso facto” clauses in voluntary administration and creditors schemes of arrangement.

Key Points

On the key points:

In a wide-reaching judgment concerning an appeal by Mighty River International in the administration of Mesa Minerals, the Western Australian Court of Appeal, has recognised that “holding” Deed of Company Arrangement (DOCA) is permissible under Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act.

The key points – Holding DOCAs as a flexible framework

The key points for insolvency and turnaround professionals to take from Mighty River International v Hughes are:

In a decision of importance for liquidators and litigation funders, the Western Australian Court of Appeal in Perrine v Carrello has further explained the important issue of how to determine the amount of compensation recoverable by liquidators where insolvent trading has occurred.

In a wide-reaching judgment concerning an appeal by Mighty River International in the administration of Mesa Minerals, the Western Australian Court of Appeal has recognised that a "holding" Deed of Company Arrangement (DOCA) is permissible under Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act.

The key points - Holding DOCAs as a flexible framework

The key points for insolvency and turnaround professionals to take from Mighty River International v. Hughes are:

A common issue that arises in many bankruptcy cases is whether a creditor who refuses to return collateral that he repossessed prior to the petition date violates the automatic stay. In February, the Tenth Circuit widened a circuit split by adopting the minority position that to violate the automatic stay in bankruptcy a creditor must take action, not merely retain the property of the estate. The Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. 362, prohibits any post-petition "act to obtain possession of property of the estate or ...

Major changes to bankruptcy rules that govern the administration of consumer bankruptcy cases, and Chapter 13 cases in particular, were recently approved by the Supreme Court and transmitted to Congress.1 After several years of drafting and debate by the rules committee, these rule amendments will become effective December 1, 2017.

On March 9, 2017, a bankruptcy court in New York became the latest to weigh in on the developing circuit court split regarding whether modification of mortgages should be permitted under 11 U.S.C.

The insolvent trading "safe harbour" and "ipso facto" clause reform

The key points

Last week, the federal government circulated an exposure draft of the Treasury Laws Amendment (2017 Enterprise Incentives No. 2) Bill (the Bill). The Bill is intended to promote entrepreneurship and innovation among directors of companies facing insolvency - this is to be achieved through two fundamental changes to existing insolvency laws.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts (the District Court) recently issued an opinion in the Paul Sagendorph bankruptcy case reversing the Bankruptcy Court's holding that a debtor can force a secured creditor to take title to its collateral in complete satisfaction of the creditor's secured claim.1 In reversing the decision of the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court held that the plain language of Sections 1322(b)(9) and 1325(a)(5)(C)2 does not empower a debtor to force a secured creditor to accept title to its collateral over that creditor's objection.3