Since 1993, decisions out of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York consistently adopted the aggregate “rent approach” for calculating lease rejection damages in bankruptcy proceedings. But in Bankruptcy Judge Wiles’ recent decision in In re Cortlandt Liquidating LLC, he departed from the “rent approach” in favor of the “time approach,” which is based on the time remaining under the lease rather than factoring in the total or aggregate rent still owed under the lease.

On August 11, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed lower court decisions rejecting Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.’s (“LBSF”) attempt to recover nearly $1 billion in payments to noteholders and enforcing certain Priority Provisions (defined below) that subordinated payments otherwise payable to LBSF under related swap transactions.

The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic will leave in its wake a significant increase in commercial chapter 11 filings. Many of these cases will feature extensive litigation involving breach of contract claims, business interruption insurance disputes, and common law causes of action based on novel interpretations of long-standing legal doctrines such as force majeure.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali recently ruled in the Chapter 11 case of Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has no jurisdiction to interfere with the ability of a bankrupt power utility company to reject power purchase agreements (“PPAs”).

The Supreme Court this week resolved a long-standing open issue regarding the treatment of trademark license rights in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court ruled in favor of Mission Products, a licensee under a trademark license agreement that had been rejected in the chapter 11 case of Tempnology, the debtor-licensor, determining that the rejection constituted a breach of the agreement but did not rescind it.

This week’s TGIF takes a look at the recent case of Mills Oakley (a partnership) v Asset HQ Australia Pty Ltd [2019] VSC 98, where the Supreme Court of Victoria found the statutory presumption of insolvency did not arise as there had not been effective service of a statutory demand due to a typographical error in the postal address.

What happened?

This week’s TGIF examines a decision of the Victorian Supreme Court which found that several proofs had been wrongly admitted or rejected, and had correct decisions been made, the company would not have been put into liquidation.

BACKGROUND

Few issues in bankruptcy create as much contention as disputes regarding the right of setoff. This was recently highlighted by a decision in the chapter 11 case of Orexigen Therapeutics in the District of Delaware.

This week’s TGIF considers Re Broens Pty Limited (in liq) [2018] NSWSC 1747, in which a liquidator was held to be justified in making distributions to creditors in spite of several claims by employees for long service leave entitlements.

What happened?

On 19 December 2016, voluntary administrators were appointed to Broens Pty Limited (the Company). The Company supplied machinery & services to manufacturers in aerospace, rail, defence and mining industries.

On November 8, 2018, Judge Vyskocil of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision dismissing the involuntary petition that had been filed against Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. (“Taberna”), a non-recourse CDO, thus ending a nearly seventeen-month-long saga that was followed closely by bankruptcy practitioners and securitization professionals alike. SeeTaberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. v. Opportunities II Ltd., et. al., (In re Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd.), No. 17-11628 (MKV), 2018 WL 5880918, at *24 (Bankr.