Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code creates a framework through which a debtor can elect to either assume or reject an executory contract. Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define “executory,” courts utilize various tests to determine if a debtor can assume a contract—and thus be obligated to perform—or reject a contract—and thus the contract is deemed breached immediately prior to the bankruptcy filing date. The Countryman test is overwhelmingly the most commonly applied test to determine a contract’s executory nature.

The Second Circuit ruled last week in Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Ass'n, No. 18-1079 (2d Cir. 2020) that a Lehman Brothers affiliate cannot claw back $1 billion in payments made pursuant to swap agreements that were terminated when Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) and certain of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in 2008. The panel concluded that the Bankruptcy Code provides a safe harbor for the liquidation of such swap agreements and also the distribution of proceeds from the collateral.

This week’s TGIF takes a look at the recent case of Mills Oakley (a partnership) v Asset HQ Australia Pty Ltd [2019] VSC 98, where the Supreme Court of Victoria found the statutory presumption of insolvency did not arise as there had not been effective service of a statutory demand due to a typographical error in the postal address.

What happened?

This week’s TGIF examines a decision of the Victorian Supreme Court which found that several proofs had been wrongly admitted or rejected, and had correct decisions been made, the company would not have been put into liquidation.

BACKGROUND

In a recent decision, EMA GARP Fund v. Banro Corporation, No. 18 CIV. 1986 (KPF), 2019 WL 773988 (S.D.N.Y. 21 February 2019), District Judge Katherine Polk Failla of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York enforced a foreign reorganization plan in the United States on the basis of international comity, notwithstanding that no application for recognition and enforcement had been made under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Banro Corp.

This week’s TGIF considers Re Broens Pty Limited (in liq) [2018] NSWSC 1747, in which a liquidator was held to be justified in making distributions to creditors in spite of several claims by employees for long service leave entitlements.

What happened?

On 19 December 2016, voluntary administrators were appointed to Broens Pty Limited (the Company). The Company supplied machinery & services to manufacturers in aerospace, rail, defence and mining industries.

This week’s TGIF considers the recent case of Vanguard v Modena [2018] FCA 1461, where the Court ordered a non-party director to pay indemnity costs due to his conduct in opposing winding-up proceedings against his company.

Background

Vanguard served a statutory demand on Modena on 27 September 2017 seeking payment of outstanding “commitment fees” totalling $138,000 which Modena was obliged, but had failed, to repay.

The recent decision of the Court of Appeal of Western Australia, Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Forge Group Power Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2018] WASCA 163 provides much needed clarity around the law of set-off. The decision will no doubt help creditors sleep well at night, knowing that when contracting with counterparties that later become insolvent they will not lose their set-off rights for a lack of mutuality where the counterparty has granted security over its assets.

This week’s TGIF considers the decision in Mujkic Family Company Pty Ltd v Clarke & Gee Pty Ltd [2018] TASFC 4, which concerns a rather novel issue – whether a solicitor acting for a shareholder might also owe a duty of care to the company in liquidation.

What happened?

In 2015, the Supreme Court of Queensland ordered that the corporate trustee of a family trust be wound up.

This week’s TGIF considers the process that a liquidator may follow when a director fails to attend at an examination. It considers the appeal in Mensink v Parbery [2018] FCAFC 101, in which the Court set out the relevant differences between arrest warrants issued to require a director to attend an examination, and arrest warrants to answer charges for contempt.

What happened?