Most restructuring professionals will tell you that there is no “typical” restructuring. That is absolutely true. Every financially distressed business is different and the character and direction of its restructuring will be highly dependent upon, among others, its capital structure, its liquidity profile, and the level of support it can build for its reorganization among key stakeholder bodies. Nevertheless, there are some important similarities in the way that any company should initially address a distressed situation.

The oil and gas industry in Texas is currently facing a double whammy from the recent oil price shock and COVID-19 related demand reductions. While exploration and production operators in Texas are proactively taking self-help measures to reinforce their financial frameworks — reducing capital spending, operating expenses, overhead and dividends — the outlook remains highly uncertain.

In recent years, it has become common practice in large chapter 11 cases for debtors to include language in their proposed chapter 11 plan which purports to release certain nondebtors from the claims of third parties. Although some third parties may consent to the release—such as by voting in favor of the plan or otherwise electing to do so during the plan solicitation process—circumstances frequently arise in which the debtors seek approval from the bankruptcy court to release nondebtors from third parties’ claims without the consent of the third parties.

This week’s TGIF takes a look at the recent case of Mills Oakley (a partnership) v Asset HQ Australia Pty Ltd [2019] VSC 98, where the Supreme Court of Victoria found the statutory presumption of insolvency did not arise as there had not been effective service of a statutory demand due to a typographical error in the postal address.

What happened?

This week’s TGIF examines a decision of the Victorian Supreme Court which found that several proofs had been wrongly admitted or rejected, and had correct decisions been made, the company would not have been put into liquidation.

BACKGROUND

This week’s TGIF considers Re Broens Pty Limited (in liq) [2018] NSWSC 1747, in which a liquidator was held to be justified in making distributions to creditors in spite of several claims by employees for long service leave entitlements.

What happened?

On 19 December 2016, voluntary administrators were appointed to Broens Pty Limited (the Company). The Company supplied machinery & services to manufacturers in aerospace, rail, defence and mining industries.

This week’s TGIF considers the recent case of Vanguard v Modena [2018] FCA 1461, where the Court ordered a non-party director to pay indemnity costs due to his conduct in opposing winding-up proceedings against his company.

Background

Vanguard served a statutory demand on Modena on 27 September 2017 seeking payment of outstanding “commitment fees” totalling $138,000 which Modena was obliged, but had failed, to repay.

The recent decision of the Court of Appeal of Western Australia, Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Forge Group Power Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2018] WASCA 163 provides much needed clarity around the law of set-off. The decision will no doubt help creditors sleep well at night, knowing that when contracting with counterparties that later become insolvent they will not lose their set-off rights for a lack of mutuality where the counterparty has granted security over its assets.

This week’s TGIF considers the decision in Mujkic Family Company Pty Ltd v Clarke & Gee Pty Ltd [2018] TASFC 4, which concerns a rather novel issue – whether a solicitor acting for a shareholder might also owe a duty of care to the company in liquidation.

What happened?

In 2015, the Supreme Court of Queensland ordered that the corporate trustee of a family trust be wound up.

This week’s TGIF considers the process that a liquidator may follow when a director fails to attend at an examination. It considers the appeal in Mensink v Parbery [2018] FCAFC 101, in which the Court set out the relevant differences between arrest warrants issued to require a director to attend an examination, and arrest warrants to answer charges for contempt.

What happened?