Un accionista solicitó del juzgado mercantil que se acordara la disolución judicial de la compañía en la que participaba (y que se nombrara liquidador a quien ostentaba la condición de administrador) por haberse producido la paralización de los órganos sociales (art. 363.1.d Ley de Sociedades de Capital [LSC]). En el procedimiento no se discutió la realidad de esta paralización, pero se alegó —para oponerse a lo solicitado— que se había incumplido el requisito de la previa convocatoria de junta general extraordinaria.
This week’s TGIF considers Re GGA Lifestyle Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed); Ex Parte Woodhouse [2019] WASC 167, where the Supreme Court of Western Australia clarified that a voluntary administrator of a company in administration is able to claim costs of care, preservation and realisation of partnership assets of the company in administration through an equitable lien in the same way liquidators can.
What happened?
Se presentó a inscripción en el Registro Mercantil escritura pública de fusión en la que la sociedad absorbente estaba íntegramente participada por la sociedad absorbida (que se encontraba en liquidación). Los acuerdos de fusión fueron adoptados por el socio único de la sociedad absorbente (esto es, por la sociedad absorbida, representada por el liquidador). La registradora denegó la inscripción argumentando, entre otras cosas, que resultaba preciso también el acuerdo de la junta general de la sociedad absorbida.
This week’s TGIF considers the recent case of Halifax Investment Services Pty Ltd (In liquidation) (No 4) [2019] FCA 604 where the Federal Court granted an application by liquidators of a company to electronically publish notices required to be sent to creditors as part of their initial reporting obligations in a winding up, to save costs and time, in cir
This week’s TGIF considers the decision in Erskine as liquidator of North Shore Property Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) v 72-74 Gordon Crescent Lane Cove Pty Ltd [2019] FCAFC 62, where a determination was upheld that Courts should not go behind a deed of release entered into by a liquidator without a valid basis for doing so.
This week’s TGIF considers a recent decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal where a company’s creditors successfully opposed an application by the company’s liquidators to compromise proceedings commenced on the company’s behalf.
This week’s TGIF takes a look at the recent case of Mills Oakley (a partnership) v Asset HQ Australia Pty Ltd [2019] VSC 98, where the Supreme Court of Victoria found the statutory presumption of insolvency did not arise as there had not been effective service of a statutory demand due to a typographical error in the postal address.
What happened?
This week’s TGIF examines a decision of the Victorian Supreme Court which found that several proofs had been wrongly admitted or rejected, and had correct decisions been made, the company would not have been put into liquidation.
BACKGROUND
En su Sentencia de 1 de marzo de 2019 [RJ 2019/622] el Tribunal Supremo ha venido a interpretar la excepción a la subordinación de los créditos de las personas especialmente relacionadas con el concursado que se contiene en el artículo 92.5º de la Ley Concursal (LC).
This week’s TGIF considers a recent decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal where a company’s creditors successfully opposed an application by the company’s liquidators to compromise proceedings commenced on the company’s behalf.