The Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) (Amendment) Ordinance 2016 (the "Amendment Ordinance") came into effect on 13 February 2017 seeking to revamp and modernize the winding-up regime in Hong Kong, but does it go far enough?

Indentures governing high yield and investment grade notes typically provide for a make-whole or other premium to be paid if the issuer redeems the underlying notes prior to maturity. The premiums are intended to compensate the investor for the loss of the bargained-for stream of income over a fixed period of time.[1] Generally, though, under New York law, a make-whole or other premium is not payable upon acceleration of notes after an event of default absent specific indenture language to the contrary.

On September 1, 2016, a rehabilitation procedure was commenced in the Seoul Central District Court in respect of Hanjin Shipping Co., Ltd (Hanjin). This action followed many months of discussions between Hanjin and its creditors (both local and international) designed to reach a consensual restructuring, as a result of which various creditors had voluntarily agreed to postpone exercising claims. Such agreement was eventually suspended on August 30, 2016 following notice to Hanjin that such creditors were unable to continue their support.

Background

Earlier this year the Committee to Strengthen Singapore as an International Centre for Debt Restructuring (the "Committee") published, and the Singapore Ministry of Law accepted, recommendations aimed at enhancing Singapore's position as a `lead centre' for international debt restructuring. Is Singapore now well-positioned to become Asia Pacific's debt restructuring hub?

Background

On 3 June 2016, the Hong Kong Government gazetted the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) (Amendment) Ordinance 2016 (“Amendment Ordinance”). The date of commencement of the Amendment Ordinance will be appointed by the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury by notice published in the Gazette.

Background

Introduction

Over the last few years, the European leveraged finance market has seen rapid growth of senior secured high yield notes (“SSN”) and senior secured covenant-lite term loan  B (“TLB”) financings. A common feature of both SSNs and TLBs (together “Senior Secured Debt”) is that their terms typically permit the incurrence of senior unsecured debt by a borrower and its restricted subsidiaries (a “Credit Group”) subject to either satisfaction of a  financial ratio or through various permitted debt baskets.