We have previously blogged about Siegel v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court decision last June that invalidated the 2018 difference in fees between bankruptcy cases filed in Bankruptcy Administrator judicial districts and U.S. Trustee judicial districts.
To encourage parties to transact with debtors in bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code in corporate bankruptcies provides highest priority to “administrative expenses,” which include “the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 503(b); id. § 507(a)(2).
We have previously written about Siegel v. Fitzgerald, No. 21-441, the Supreme Court case considering the question of whether the 2018 difference in fees between Bankruptcy Administrator judicial districts and U.S. Trustee judicial districts was consistent with the Constitution’s uniformity requirement for bankruptcy laws.
A discharge in bankruptcy usually discharges a debtor from the debtor’s liabilities. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, however, sets forth certain exceptions to this policy, including for “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
The Court of Appeal has confirmed that the High Court was right to restrict the assistance an English court could give to a Russian trustee in bankruptcy at common law, refusing to allow immoveable property situated in England to be administered by the trustee as part of the foreign bankruptcy proceedings: Kireeva v Bedzhamov [2022] EWCA Civ 35.
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress the power to “establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” While Congress has general authority to establish a bankruptcy system, bankruptcy laws must be “uniform.” But not every aspect of the bankruptcy system is the same across every judicial district.
The High Court has ruled that a claim for a declaration regarding a borrower’s obligations to provide information under a facility agreement was not a claim which itself derived from borrower’s French insolvency proceedings for the purposes of Article 6(1) of the Recast European Insolvency Regulation (EU) 2015/848 (the “Recast Insolvency Regulation”).
The Bankruptcy Code grants the power to avoid certain transactions to a bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547–48. Is there a general requirement that these avoidance powers only be used when doing so would benefit creditors? In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico addressed this question, concluding, in the face of a split of authority, that there was such a requirement.
A creditor in bankruptcy must normally file a proof of claim by a certain specified time, known as the bar date, or have its claim be barred.
The High Court has held that an examination conducted pursuant to an order made under s.236 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (“IA”) did not attract witness immunity. The result was that the joint liquidators were permitted to amend their particulars of claim to plead a claim for breach of duty relating to false statements made in the course of the examination: Mitchell v Al Jaber [2021] EWHC 912 (Ch).