The term “golden shares” is often referred to equity interests held by a specific party—commonly a lender or investor—that authorize such party to block or prevent a corporate entity from filing bankruptcy. Such shares are often negotiated by a party that wants to ensure that its consent is obtained before any bankruptcy is commenced. Without such consent, the party holding the golden shares can seek to dismiss to a corporate bankruptcy filing by based on a lack of corporate authority.

On 21 April 2018, new rules regarding the handling of “group” insolvency proceedings of companies in Germany become effective.

The regulations aim at better coordination between separate insolvency proceedings which must be implemented for every company within a group under German insolvency rulings. Up to now, coordination was quite difficult, due to separate responsibilities of different courts and insolvency administrators.

The Bankruptcy Code often instructs a trustee or debtor to perform an act or make an election within a certain time. Sometimes the relevant provisions are intended to benefit a party in interest who is affected by a debtor’s or trustee’s action or election. Unfortunately, some of the provisions that prescribe a trustee or debtor to act fail to provide a remedy to the affected party in interest in the event the trustee or debtor does not act in compliance with the Code.

In In re Hungry Horse, LLC, Adversary Proceeding No. 16-11222 (Bankr. D. N.M. September 20, 2017) (“Hungry Horse”), the New Mexico Bankruptcy Court reminded us that many U.S. Supreme Court opinions can be limited in scope and do not necessarily dispose of all potential remedies to an issue.

Summary

In May 2017, the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), Az. XI ZR 571/15, has given its views for the first time on bridging loans (Überbrückungskredite) and their validity in a restructuring scenario.

Summary

The German Federal Court of Finance (BFH) has recently decided on the tax treatment of profits resulting from debt waived in the course of a company´s restructuring (case file no. GrS 1/15, 28 November 2016).

The BFH:

In In re NewPage Corporation, et al., Adversary Proceeding No. 13-52429 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 13, 2017), a Delaware Bankruptcy Court applied a unique defense to certain preferential transfers targeted by a liquidating trustee. The defense focuses on a commonly overlooked element of a preferential transfer, section 547(b)(5).

Preference 101

State and federal laws provide numerous protections to secured parties to preserve their interests in collateral. As secured parties well know, however, these protections become more and more limited when the collateral is pledged to multiple secured parties. Issues, like priority of interests and liens, become more prevalent when the collateral at issue falls in value and multiple secured parties are fighting to enforce their interests in order to satisfy their debts.

State and federal laws provide numerous protections to secured parties to preserve their interests in collateral.  As secured parties well know, however, these protections become more and more limited when the collateral is pledged to multiple secured parties.  Issues, like priority of interests and liens, become more prevalent when the collateral at issue falls in value and multiple secured parties are fighting to enforce their interests in order to satisfy their debts.

Summary

The German Federal Court has recently examined the treatment of shareholder loans and how these creditor claims are classified in the event of a company’s insolvency (decision by the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) dated 13 October 2016 (file no. IX ZR 184/14)).

Background