A secured creditor with a hypothec (charge) over a specific immovable property can enforce against that property without having to put the debtor through a full-blown bankruptcy process. That was one of the key outcomes of the Royal Court's decision in Representation of Prospect Holdings Limited[2025] JRC 164.

What happened?

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

On 27 February 2024, the High Court sanctioned a restructuring plan (the Plan) proposed by CB&I UK Limited (CB&I), part of the global McDermott construction and engineering group (the Group). This is the first English restructuring plan to be approved after the Court of Appeal judgment in Adler (see our Alert) and follows the guidance in that case.

Background

On 23 January 2024, the Court of Appeal overturned the High Court's sanction of Adler Group's (Adler) restructuring plan (the Plan) (see our alert). This much anticipated judgment provides clarity on the court's discretion to sanction a plan where there are dissenting classes of creditors.

Background

The Plan envisaged:

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Introduction

The first stage in any restructuring by way of a scheme of arrangement in the Cayman Islands involves meetings of such classes of creditors or shareholders (as the case may be) to consider, and if thought fit, approve the terms of the scheme. An application to Court is required for orders to be granted for convening such meetings. If, at these meetings, the requisite statutory majorities are satisfied, the second stage involves obtaining Court sanction for the proposed scheme to become effective.

Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands all have legislation that enables a company to present a scheme of arrangement to restructure its debts.

One of the defining features of a scheme of arrangement carried out under the relevant legislation in each jurisdiction is the ability to cram down dissenting creditors or members (or classes of them, as the case may be) if the requisite statutory majorities are satisfied and Court sanction of the proposed scheme is obtained.

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

The Court of Appeal has recently referred to established case law that the court will only interfere with the act of an officeholder “if he has done something so utterly unreasonable and absurd that no reasonable man would have done it”.

While the judge in the lower court had not made any error of law, on the facts there were identifiable flaws in the judge's reasoning that the trustees' decision not to join in the proceedings was perverse.

The judge had failed to recognise that: