This past year was marked by extraordinary deal activity. Record breaking M&A activity drove record breaking private credit activity. Private equity M&A activity was at a substantial high, with over 8,500 deals worth $2.1 trillion, a 60% increase over 2020. Not surprisingly, in this environment, defaults were at all-time lows. The Proskauer Private Credit Default tracker showed an active default rate of approximately 1% at the end of 2021, compared to 3.6% in 2020.
Despite the Supreme Court’s rejection of a structured dismissal in 2017,[1] there is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.
The primary investment thesis of a private credit lender is simple — get the loan repaid at maturity. Private credit lenders do not make loans as a means to acquire their borrower’s business. There are circumstances, however, where private credit lenders must be prepared to take ownership when the borrower is distressed and there is no realistic prospect of near-term loan repayment. Becoming the owner of a borrower’s business may very well be the loan recovery option of last resort.
On 12 May 2021, in the first opposed cross-class cram down case, the English High Court sanctioned Virgin Active's restructuring plans, the first to bind landlords to lease compromises.
The decision
While the opposing landlords challenged the valuation evidence advanced by the companies, they did not advance evidence of their own. The court accepted the companies' evidence that:
On 17 May 2021, in the third of a trio of landlord challenge cases, the English High Court revoked Regis UK Limited's company voluntary arrangement (CVA) on one ground of unfair prejudice, but ruled against landlords seeking repayment of fees against the nominees.
The facts
On 10 May 2021, the English High Court rejected landlords’ challenge to the company voluntary arrangement (CVA) of fashion retailer, New Look. The New Look decision was the first in a trio of highly significant judgments focused on a distressed tenant's ability to compromise landlord's claims (our coverage of the Virgin Active and Regis decisions is available below).
The challenge
The landlords' challenge focused on jurisdiction, unfair prejudice and material irregularity as a result of the following:
IP licensing and insolvency reform: ipso facto clauses
Licensors of intellectual property rights may soon be unable to terminate licenses where the licensee has gone into an insolvency process.
What are ipso facto clauses and why do they matter?
How was the CIGB received?
Were there any concerns?
What has changed?
What else was proposed?
What's next?
A recap
After the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill (CIGB) was published on 20 May 2020, it raced through the House of Commons and House of Lords and, on 26 June 2020 (in under 6 weeks) came into force as the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (CIGA), with certain of the temporary measures taking effect from 1 March 2020.
How was the CIGB received?