Hungarian insolvency law provides for a right of the liquidator to terminate, with immediate effect, contracts concluded by the debtor, or – in case neither of the parties rendered any services – to rescind the contract. This applies even in cases where contractual provisions or relevant legislation would otherwise prohibit the termination of the given contract.

With the effect of 1 September 2015, Hungary introduces legal provisions on personal insolvency. Such procedure is reserved for private individuals (may they be entrepreneurs or consumers), who have debts between HUF 2 mln (approx. EUR 6,500) and HUF 60 mln (approx.EUR 195,000).

Under Hungarian insolvency law, creditors secured by mortgages or pledges are entitled to privileged satisfaction of their claim, meaning concretely that they are entitled to receive the whole proceeds reached in the course of the realization of the pledged property after deduction of the (i) cost of keeping the property in good repair and of maintenance, and costs of selling the pledged property; and (ii) the liquidator’s fee up to 5% of the net purchase price.

Potential liability for wrongful trading

In Hungary the Act no. XLIX of 1991 on the insolvency and compulsory winding up procedure (hereinafter referred to as “Insolvency Act”) established the term “wrongful trading”. Under section 33/A of the Insolvency Act a manager of a company shall be personally liable if after the occurrence of threatening insolvency (i.e. when the company is unable to settle its liabilities when due) the director’s duties have not been fulfilled based on the priority of the company’s creditors’ interest.

On December 5, 2013, Judge Steven Rhodes of the US Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the city of Detroit had satisfied the five expressly delineated eligibility requirements for filing under Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code¹ and so could proceed with its bankruptcy case.

On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Circuit Court”) issued an opinion in In re TOUSA, Inc.,¹ in which it affirmed the original decision of the bankruptcy court and reversed the appellate decision of the district court. After a 13-day trial, the bankruptcy court had found that liens granted by certain TOUSA subsidiaries (the “Conveying Subsidiaries”) to secure new loans (the “New Term Loans”) incurred to pay off preexisting indebtedness to certain lenders (the “Transeastern Lenders”) were avoidable fraudulent transfers.

Introduction

The recent bankruptcy filings by infrastructure companies Connector 2000 Association Inc., South Bay Expressway, L.P., California Transportation Ventures, Inc., and the Las Vegas Monorail Company have tested the structures utilized to implement public-private partnerships (P3s) in the United States in several respects. It is still too early to draw definitive conclusions about the impact of these proceedings on P3 structures going forward, but initial rulings in two of the cases are already focusing the minds of project participants on threshold structuring considerations.

In a decision that reaffirms its previous rulings on the jurisdictional limits of bankruptcy courts, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Chakarian (In re W.R. Grace & Co.)1 that bankruptcy courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over third-party actions against non-debtors if such actions could affect a debtor’s bankruptcy estate only following the filing of another lawsuit.

To promote equal treatment of creditors, the US Congress has armed debtors with the power to bring suit to recover a variety of pre-bankruptcy transfers. Prominent among these is a debtor’s ability under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code to recover constructively fraudulent transfers — i.e., transfers made without fair consideration when a debtor is insolvent.