From 1 December 2020 onwards, HMRC will be treated as a preferential creditor of companies for certain taxes including PAYE, VAT, employee NICs and Construction Industry Scheme deductions. In the event that a company enters administration or liquidation, HMRC's claim for these taxes will rank ahead of any floating charge holder.

This reflects recent changes made to the Finance Act 2020.

The impact on floating charge holders

On 13 January 2021, the English High Court sanctioned three interconditional Part 26A restructuring plans for the subsidiaries of DeepOcean Group Holding BV.

The plans for two of the companies were approved by the required 75% majority. While the third plan received 100% approval by secured creditors, only 64.6% of unsecured creditors voted in favour.

Consequently, at the sanction hearing the court was required to consider whether the cross-class cram down mechanism in the restructuring plan should be engaged for the first time in the UK.

On 11 February 2021, the English High Court confirmed in gategroup Guarantee Limited that restructuring plans are insolvency proceedings so are not covered by the Lugano Convention.

One of the debt instruments subject to the gategroup restructuring plan contains an exclusive Swiss court jurisdiction clause. Under the Lugano Convention, proceedings relating to "civil and commercial matters" must generally be brought in the jurisdiction benefitting from the exclusive jurisdiction clause.

In Uralkali v Rowley and another [2020] EWHC 3442 (Ch) – a UK High Court case relating to the administration of a Formula 1 racing team – an unsuccessful bidder for the company's business and assets sued the administrators, arguing that the bid process had been negligently misrepresented and conducted.

The court found that the administrators did not owe a duty of care to the disappointed bidder. It rejected the claimant's criticisms of the company’s sale process and determined that the administrators had conducted it "fairly and properly" and were not, in fact, negligent.

In Uralkali v Rowley and another [2020] EWHC 3442 (Ch) – a UK High Court case relating to the administration of a Formula 1 racing team – an unsuccessful bidder for the company's business and assets sued the administrators, arguing that the bid process had been negligently misrepresented and conducted.

The court found that the administrators did not owe a duty of care to the disappointed bidder. It rejected the claimant's criticisms of the company’s sale process and determined that the administrators had conducted it "fairly and properly" and were not, in fact, negligent.

The ability to "surcharge" a secured creditor's collateral in bankruptcy is an important resource available to a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession ("DIP"), particularly in cases where there is little or no equity in the estate to pay administrative costs, such as the fees and expenses of estate-retained professionals. However, as demonstrated by a ruling handed down by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the circumstances under which collateral may be surcharged are narrow. In In re Towne, Inc., 2013 BL 232068 (3d Cir. Aug.

Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code contemplates bifurcation of a debtor's obligation to a secured creditor into secured and unsecured claims, depending on the value of the collateral securing the debt. The term "value," however, is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, and bankruptcy courts vary in their approaches to the meaning of the term. In In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., 679 F.3d 132 (3d Cir.

The ability to sell an asset in bankruptcy free and clear of liens and any other competing “interest” is a well-recognized tool available to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”). Whether the category of “interests” encompassed by that power extends to potential successor liability claims, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in the courts. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this controversial issue in Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).