Some 13 years ago, Lehman Brothers' sudden and unexpected insolvency sent ripples across the banking and financial services market, some of which are still felt today.
The Court of Appeal's decision in the consolidated cases of Lehman Brothers Holdings Scottish LP 3 v Lehman Brothers Holdings plc (in administration) and others1 [2021] EWCA Civ 1523 was the latest in a long line of cases seeking to unwind the issues arising from Lehman Brothers' unexpected collapse.
The background
This recent interlocutory decision in The Deposit Guarantee Fund for Individuals (" the DGF") v Bank Frick & Co AG ("Bank Frick") & Anor deals another blow to the DGF in its recent attempts to pursue claims in England which allegedly arise following the 2014-15 banking crisis in Ukraine.
Background
A recent application made by the insolvency practitioner of Agrokor, a major Croatian conglomerate, resulted in recognition in England of a stay of civil proceedings against the group. The purpose of the application was to halt any proceedings in relation to Agrokor's securities and debt obligations containing English law and jurisdiction provisions, pending the restructuring in the Croatian insolvency proceedings of the group's affairs.
In Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in Administration) v Exxonmobil Financial Services BV(1) the High Court considered a range of issues arising from the application of the close-out provisions of the standard-form Global Master Repurchase Agreement (GMRA) 2000.
The recent judgment of Mrs Justice Proudman in Plaza BV –v- The Law Debenture Trust Corporation1 illustrates and extends a line of authorities in which the English courts have sought to narrow the scope of the mandatory application of Article 2 of the Brussels Regulation 44/2001. These cases are a reaction to the broad interpretation of the applicability and effect of Article 2 set out in the ECJ's decision in Owusu –v- Jackson2 , and attempt to confine the influence of that decision.
The ability to "surcharge" a secured creditor's collateral in bankruptcy is an important resource available to a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession ("DIP"), particularly in cases where there is little or no equity in the estate to pay administrative costs, such as the fees and expenses of estate-retained professionals. However, as demonstrated by a ruling handed down by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the circumstances under which collateral may be surcharged are narrow. In In re Towne, Inc., 2013 BL 232068 (3d Cir. Aug.
Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code contemplates bifurcation of a debtor's obligation to a secured creditor into secured and unsecured claims, depending on the value of the collateral securing the debt. The term "value," however, is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, and bankruptcy courts vary in their approaches to the meaning of the term. In In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., 679 F.3d 132 (3d Cir.
The ability to sell an asset in bankruptcy free and clear of liens and any other competing “interest” is a well-recognized tool available to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”). Whether the category of “interests” encompassed by that power extends to potential successor liability claims, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in the courts. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this controversial issue in Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).