During this time of economic upheaval amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, many corporate borrowers are faced with the inability to service debt obligations, and creditors may seek to hold corporate officers and directors accountable as a result. In these uncertain times, it is wise to review the fiduciary duties of corporate directors and officers and the effects of financial distress on such duties.[1] The following Q&A provides guidance on this issue from a Delaware law perspective, as Delaware is the most commonly cited jurisdiction for corporate governance.

The impact of COVID-19 is yet to be fully realized, and many companies are yet to consider restructuring as a means to survive the pandemic, but all companies and all creditors can benefit now from learning how employee matters are treated in a bankruptcy proceeding under chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (as amended, the Bankruptcy Code). This blog provides a high-level overview of some of the most material matters affecting an employee workforce in the context of a chapter 11 restructuring.

As American individuals, employers, and governments are implementing various restrictions from social distancing to quarantines to reduce the rate of new COVID-19 infections, each of these decisions results in an increasingly negative impact on the American economy. Even with the recent financial aid package passed by Congress, with greater credit constraints and a heightened sensitivity to weak consumer demand, small businesses are among those hit the hardest by COVID-19 restrictions.

SNDA Basics

A subordination, nondisturbance and attornment agreement (“SNDA”) is commonly used in real estate financing to clarify the rights and obligations between the owner of rental property (i.e., the borrower), the lender that provides financing secured by the property, and the tenant under a lease of the property in the event the lender forecloses or otherwise acquires title to the property. As suggested by its name, an SNDA has the following three primary components:

The United States Supreme Court (the “Court”) recently issued a long-awaited decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (“Jevic”), which limits the use of “structured dismissals” in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, requiring structured dismissals pursuant to which final distributions are made to comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, or the consent of all affected parties to be obtained.1

What is a Structured Dismissal?

Nearly four years after its decision in Stern v. Marshall raised new doubts about the place of bankruptcy courts in our legal system, the Supreme Court has finally put those doubts to rest. This week, in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 13-935, the Court held that even for claims that must otherwise be resolved by an Article III court, a bankruptcy court may still adjudicate the matter based on consent.

The case of Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency), No. 12- 1200, was easily one of the most closely watched bankruptcy cases in many years. Last week’s decision in that case, however, was far less dramatic than  some practitioners feared it might be. The Supreme Court answered two important questions regarding the power of bankruptcy courts that it left open three years ago in Stern v. Marshall.