During this time of economic upheaval amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, many corporate borrowers are faced with the inability to service debt obligations, and creditors may seek to hold corporate officers and directors accountable as a result. In these uncertain times, it is wise to review the fiduciary duties of corporate directors and officers and the effects of financial distress on such duties.[1] The following Q&A provides guidance on this issue from a Delaware law perspective, as Delaware is the most commonly cited jurisdiction for corporate governance.

As American individuals, employers, and governments are implementing various restrictions from social distancing to quarantines to reduce the rate of new COVID-19 infections, each of these decisions results in an increasingly negative impact on the American economy. Even with the recent financial aid package passed by Congress, with greater credit constraints and a heightened sensitivity to weak consumer demand, small businesses are among those hit the hardest by COVID-19 restrictions.

The United States Supreme Court (the “Court”) recently issued a long-awaited decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (“Jevic”), which limits the use of “structured dismissals” in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, requiring structured dismissals pursuant to which final distributions are made to comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, or the consent of all affected parties to be obtained.1

What is a Structured Dismissal?

Debt exchanges have long been utilized by distressed companies to address liquidity concerns and to take advantage of beneficial market conditions. A company saddled with burdensome debt obligations, for example, may seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with the same outstanding principal but with borrower-favorable terms, like delayed payment or extended maturation dates (a "Face Value Exchange"). Or the company might seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with a lower face amount, motivated by discounted trading values for the existing notes (a "Fair Value Exchange").

One of the primary fights underlying assumption of an unexpired lease or executory contract has long been over whether any debtor breaches under the agreement are “curable.” Before the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, courts were split over whether historic nonmonetary breaches (such as a failure to maintain cash reserves or prescribed hours of operation) undermined a debtor’s ability to assume the lease or contract.