Disagreeing with the much-critiqued SDNY opinion in Enron, the SDNY bankruptcy court disallowed claims brought by secondary transferees because the original claimants allegedly received millions of dollars in fraudulent transfers and preferences from the Debtors that have not been repaid. Deepening the district spilt on the nature of Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court held that the defense barring fraudulent transfer-tainted claims focuses on claims—not claimants—and cannot be “washed clean” by a subsequent transfer in the secondary market.

In the fifth opinion involving the repo liquidation saga of HomeBanc, the Third Circuit addressed several crucial issues involving the liquidation and valuation of repo collateral in bankruptcy. In re HomeBanc Mortg. Corp., 2019 WL 7161215 (3d Cir. Dec. 24, 2019).

Background

In a matter of first impression, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of New York recently analyzed whether a debtor may exempt from her bankruptcy estate a retirement account that was bequeathed to her upon the death of her parent. In In re Todd, 585 B.R. 297 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y 2018), the court addressed an objection to a debtor’s claim of exemption in an inherited retirement account, and held that the property was not exempt under New York and federal law.

In Kaye v. Blue Bell Creameries (In re BFW Liquidation), 899 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that a liability for an allegedly preferential transfer may be reduced by the amount of new value given, regardless of whether that new value has already been repaid by the debtor before its bankruptcy filing.

On June 4, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lamar Archer & Cofrin LLP v. Appling,[1] resolving a circuit split on the issue of whether a debtor’s statement about a single asset constitutes “a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” for the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).

Alerts and Updates

The Supreme Court’s opinion is significant because it will encourage creditors to rely on written, rather than oral, statements of debtors as to both their assets and overall financial status, which are better evidence in a nondischargeability case.

In a recent decision out of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia, a court analyzed the effect of a setoff effectuated between two governmental units in the 90 days prior to the filing of a husband and wife’s bankruptcy case. In Hurt v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (In re Hurt), 579 B.R. 765 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2017), the court addressed competing motions for summary judgment filed by the debtors, on the one hand, and the U.S.

U.S. Bankruptcy Rule 9019 provides that on a motion brought by a trustee (and thus a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession as well) the court may approve a settlement. The prevailing view is that due to the court’s approval requirement, pre-court approval settlement agreements are enforceable by the debtor but not against the debtor. The District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently disagreed. It held that the statutory approval requirement is not an opportunity for the debtor to repudiate the settlement.

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding, 580 U.S. __(2017), decided on March 22, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, without the consent of impaired creditors, a bankruptcy court cannot approve a "structured dismissal" that provides for distributions deviating from the ordinary priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code. The ruling reverses the decisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, and the U.S.

The immediate effect of Jevic will be that practitioners may no longer structure dismissals in any manner that deviates from the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code without the consent of impaired creditors.