One of the benefits the US Bankruptcy Code offers debtors is the ability to assign freely contracts under which the debtor has ongoing performance obligations, even if the underlying contract contains a restriction or prohibition against such assignment. Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code has its limits and does impose certain conditions to such assignment, such as the curing of defaults under the contract (other than so-called “ipso facto” defaults) and the requirement that the assignee be capable of future performance under the contract.

The Bankruptcy Code confers upon debtors or trustees, as the case may be, the power to avoid certain preferential or fraudulent transfers made to creditors within prescribed guidelines and limitations. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico recently addressed the contours of these powers through a recent decision inU.S. Glove v. Jacobs, Adv. No. 21-1009, (Bankr. D.N.M.

In In re Smith, (B.A.P. 10th Cir., Aug. 18, 2020), the U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently joined the majority of circuit courts of appeals in finding that a creditor seeking a judgment of nondischargeability must demonstrate that the injury caused by the prepetition debtor was both willful and malicious under Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Factual Background

In a recent decision, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that claim disallowance issues under Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code "travel with" the claim, and not with the claimant. Declining to follow a published district court decision from the same federal district, the bankruptcy court found that section 502(d) applies to disallow a transferred claim regardless of whether the transferee acquired its claim through an assignment or an outright sale. See In re Firestar Diamond, 615 B.R. 161 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020).

InIn re Juarez, 603 B.R. 610 (9th Cir. BAP 2019), the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed a question of first impression in the circuit with respect to property that is exempt from creditor reach: it adopted the view that, under the "new value exception" to the "absolute priority rule," an individual Chapter 11 debtor intending to retain such property need not make a "new value" contribution covering the value of the exemption.

Background

In In re Palladino, 942 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2019), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed whether a debtor receives “reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for paying his adult child’s college tuition. The Palladino court answered this question in the negative, thereby contributing to the growing circuit split regarding the avoidability of debtors’ college tuition payments for their adult children as constructively fraudulent transfers.

Background

In this type of market environment, one or more of the following scenarios may apply:

The US Supreme Court has reversed the First Circuit's ruling in Mission Products (Mission Prod. Holdings v. Tempnology, LLC (In re Tempnology, LLC), 879 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 2018)), thereby allowing the trademark licensee in that case to continue using the licensed trademark despite the debtor trademark licensor's rejection of the underlying trademark agreement in its bankruptcy case.

The US Supreme Court has reversed the First Circuit’s ruling in Mission Products (Mission Prod. Holdings v. Tempnology, LLC (In re Tempnology, LLC), 879 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 2018)), thereby allowing the trademark licensee in that case to continue using the licensed trademark despite the debtor trademark licensor’s rejection of the underlying trademark agreement in its bankruptcy case.

In a matter of first impression, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of New York recently analyzed whether a debtor may exempt from her bankruptcy estate a retirement account that was bequeathed to her upon the death of her parent. In In re Todd, 585 B.R. 297 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y 2018), the court addressed an objection to a debtor’s claim of exemption in an inherited retirement account, and held that the property was not exempt under New York and federal law.