Compensation for bankruptcy professionals employed in bankruptcy cases is governed by Section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 330(a)(1) of the code provides, in pertinent part, that "the court may award to ... a professional person employed under Section 327 or 1103—(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered." Professionals whose employment is approved by the bankruptcy court consequently must file fee applications, to be reviewed and approved by the court for work performed in the bankruptcy case.

On Jan. 21, in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Motors Liquidation v. JPMorgan Chase Bank (In re Motors Liquidation), No. 13-2187, (2d Cir. Jan. 21, 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed whether a UCC-3 termination statement, which was improperly filed as part of the repayment of an unrelated loan, may be considered effective to terminate the security interest in question, even where none of the parties intended that result.

In the recent landmark decision of Re Vanguard Energy Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 156, the Singapore High Court confirmed that litigation funding may, in the context of insolvency and under the appropriate circumstances, be permitted in Singapore.

Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code provides creditors with a mechanism to force a recalcitrant debtor into bankruptcy through the filing of an involuntary petition for relief. Pursuant to this section, an involuntary bankruptcy case may be commenced only under Chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and may only be brought against a person otherwise qualified to file a voluntary petition. Where the purported debtor has fewer than 12 creditors, the involuntary petition need only be filed by a single creditor.

In a case of first impression in Texas, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas held that the former majority member of a chapter 11 LLC debtor had to relinquish control of the LLC's Facebook page and Twitter account because they were property of the LLC's bankruptcy estate. In re CTLI, LLC, Case No. 14-33564, 2015 WL 1588085 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. April 3, 2015). CTLI, LLC was a Texas gun store and shooting range doing business as Tactical Firearms.

In an effort to protect the property of a bankruptcy estate, Section 362(a) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code imposes an automatic stay on most proceedings against a debtor in bankruptcy. The policy of this section is to grant relief to a debtor from creditors, and to prevent a "disorganized" dissipation of the debtor's assets. (See, e.g., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Brennan, 230 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2000).) However, the scope of the automatic stay is not all-encompassing.

In Harrington v. Simmons (In re Simmons), 513 B.R. 161 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2014), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts considered the U.S. trustee's request that a Chapter 7 debtor be denied a discharge for his failure to maintain adequate financial records or satisfactorily explain the loss of his assets.

The "American rule" is a well-defined legal principle applied by courts throughout the United States that holds each party to a dispute responsible for paying its own attorney fees. This principle is, however, subject to a number of exceptions that effectively allow a prevailing party to recover its own attorney fees from a losing party. For example, federal and state statutes increasingly authorize a prevailing party to recover costs from its adversary in certain types of actions.

In the unusual case of Albert Edward Rodrigues v Associacao Portuguesa de Socorrous Mutuos (in liquidation) (HCMP 1391/2014), the Hong Kong Court of First Instance ordered a permanent stay of a company’s creditors’ voluntary winding up which has technically been going for 25 years, and in so doing reminded us of the applicable principles and the fact sensitive nature of such applications.

Background

In the recent case of In re Shiamas International Limited (HCCW 80/2014), the Hong Kong Court of First Instance refused to stay a winding-up petition on the ground of a pending appeal from a decision of the Paris Court of Appeal to the French Court of Cassation.  This case is a timely reminder of the difficulties in obtaining a stay of a winding-up petition, the applicable principles and shows that the Court is willing to allow some flexibility.

Background