The Bankruptcy Protector
The Bankruptcy Protector
Imagine this: you sell a product to a company on credit at 8% interest until you are paid, and the company files for bankruptcy before repayment. Or maybe you are a hard money lender that made an unsecured loan at 18% to a company to bridge through hard times, and the company files for bankruptcy. Or maybe you are a secured creditor with a 5% loan on real estate, and after the borrower files for bankruptcy, you discover there is a defect in your mortgage and your lien can be stripped.
A person in possession of a debtor’s property upon a bankruptcy filing now has more guidance from the Supreme Court as to the effect of the automatic stay. In City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2021), handed down on January 14 of 2021, the Court was faced with the issue of whether the City of Chicago (the “City”) was liable for violation of the automatic stay for refusing to return vehicles it impounded pre-petition. Issuing a narrow decision under Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court held that it was not.
The Bankruptcy Code confers upon debtors or trustees, as the case may be, the power to avoid certain preferential or fraudulent transfers made to creditors within prescribed guidelines and limitations. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico recently addressed the contours of these powers through a recent decision inU.S. Glove v. Jacobs, Adv. No. 21-1009, (Bankr. D.N.M.
In In re Smith, (B.A.P. 10th Cir., Aug. 18, 2020), the U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently joined the majority of circuit courts of appeals in finding that a creditor seeking a judgment of nondischargeability must demonstrate that the injury caused by the prepetition debtor was both willful and malicious under Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Factual Background
In a recent decision, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that claim disallowance issues under Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code "travel with" the claim, and not with the claimant. Declining to follow a published district court decision from the same federal district, the bankruptcy court found that section 502(d) applies to disallow a transferred claim regardless of whether the transferee acquired its claim through an assignment or an outright sale. See In re Firestar Diamond, 615 B.R. 161 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020).
InIn re Juarez, 603 B.R. 610 (9th Cir. BAP 2019), the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed a question of first impression in the circuit with respect to property that is exempt from creditor reach: it adopted the view that, under the "new value exception" to the "absolute priority rule," an individual Chapter 11 debtor intending to retain such property need not make a "new value" contribution covering the value of the exemption.
Background
In In re Palladino, 942 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2019), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed whether a debtor receives “reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for paying his adult child’s college tuition. The Palladino court answered this question in the negative, thereby contributing to the growing circuit split regarding the avoidability of debtors’ college tuition payments for their adult children as constructively fraudulent transfers.
Background
Pacific Gas and Electric Company and PG&E Corporation (together “PG&E”) filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California on January 29, 2019.
In a matter of first impression, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of New York recently analyzed whether a debtor may exempt from her bankruptcy estate a retirement account that was bequeathed to her upon the death of her parent. In In re Todd, 585 B.R. 297 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y 2018), the court addressed an objection to a debtor’s claim of exemption in an inherited retirement account, and held that the property was not exempt under New York and federal law.