When a debtor files for bankruptcy, it’s axiomatic that all creditors, wherever located, must immediately cease their efforts to collect on debts owed to them by that debtor, right? Not necessarily so, says the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, insofar as those creditors and their collateral are located outside of the United States.

The Bankruptcy Protector

Envision a scenario in which you purchased a right of first refusal for a parcel of real estate. That right, as bargained for, would let you purchase the parcel if it was put up for sale by matching any competing bidder’s offer. As a diligent prospective purchaser, you would naturally record that right of first refusal in the appropriate land records. So far so good.

A person in possession of a debtor’s property upon a bankruptcy filing now has more guidance from the Supreme Court as to the effect of the automatic stay. In City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2021), handed down on January 14 of 2021, the Court was faced with the issue of whether the City of Chicago (the “City”) was liable for violation of the automatic stay for refusing to return vehicles it impounded pre-petition. Issuing a narrow decision under Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court held that it was not.

In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.

In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina

It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .

本文主要讨论公司型基金、合伙型基金自行清算的主要流程，并就基金自行清算出现僵局等情形时，如何申请法院启动基金强制清算程序的主要问题作初步探讨。

基金清算适用的法律

对于公司型基金的清算，其主要适用《公司法》以及《最高人民法院关于适用＜中华人民共和国公司法＞若干问题的规定（二）》（下称“《公司法司法解释二》”）《关于审理公司强制清算案件工作座谈会纪要》（下称“《强制清算纪要》”）以及部分高院出台的相关审判指导。

对于合伙型基金的清算，除适用《合伙企业法》外，可参照公司法律的有关规定。对此，《民法总则》第一百零八条规定，“非法人组织除适用本章规定外，参照适用本编第三章第一节的有关规定”；第三编第一节对法人清算作出了相关规定，其中第七十一条规定，“法人的清算程序和清算组职权，依照有关法律的规定；没有规定的，参照适用公司法律的有关规定”。例如，北京一中院在（2020）京01清申27号《民事裁定书》中基于上述规定，认定合伙型基金的清算应当参照《公司法》的相关规定进行。

除前述规定外，中国证监会、中基协的相关规定，以及其他行业自治组织的相关规定，亦可作为基金清算的依据。

I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.

Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.

Our February 26 post entitled “SBRA Springs to Life”^[1] reported on the first case known to me that dealt with the issue whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case should be permitted to amend its petition to designate it as a case under Subchapter V,^[2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by