When a debtor files for bankruptcy, it’s axiomatic that all creditors, wherever located, must immediately cease their efforts to collect on debts owed to them by that debtor, right? Not necessarily so, says the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, insofar as those creditors and their collateral are located outside of the United States.
The Bankruptcy Protector
Envision a scenario in which you purchased a right of first refusal for a parcel of real estate. That right, as bargained for, would let you purchase the parcel if it was put up for sale by matching any competing bidder’s offer. As a diligent prospective purchaser, you would naturally record that right of first refusal in the appropriate land records. So far so good.
A person in possession of a debtor’s property upon a bankruptcy filing now has more guidance from the Supreme Court as to the effect of the automatic stay. In City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2021), handed down on January 14 of 2021, the Court was faced with the issue of whether the City of Chicago (the “City”) was liable for violation of the automatic stay for refusing to return vehicles it impounded pre-petition. Issuing a narrow decision under Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court held that it was not.
This week’s TGIF considers a recent case where the Supreme Court of Queensland rejected a director’s application to access an executory contract of sale entered into by receivers and managers on the basis it was not a ‘financial record’
Key Takeaways
This week’s TGIF looks at the decision of the Federal Court of Australia in Donoghue v Russells (A Firm)[2021] FCA 798 in which Mr Donoghue appealed a decision to make a sequestration order which was premised on him ‘carrying on business in Australia' for the purpose of section 43(1)(b)(iii) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Act).
Key Takeaways
This week’s TGIF considers an application to the Federal Court for the private hearing of a public examination where separate criminal proceedings were also on foot.
Key takeaways
This week’s TGIF looks at a recent decision of the Victorian Supreme Court, where a winding up application was adjourned to allow the debtor company to pursue restructuring under the recently introduced small business restructuring reforms.
Key takeaways
Un emprunteur qui, sans en avoir le droit, ne paierait pas l'échéance d'un crédit entre le 12 mars 2020 et l'expiration d'un délai d'un mois à compter de la date de cessation de l'état d'urgence sanitaire (lui-même censé durer deux mois à compter du 24 mars 2020 sauf report), pourrait arguer que la clause d'exigibilité anticipée du crédit et la clause d'intérêts de retard (une clause pénale) ne pourront produire leurs effets qu'à compter de l'expiration de cette période en application de l'ordonnance n° 2020-306 du 25 mars 2020 prise en application de la loi d'urgence n° 2020-290 du 23 mars
A borrower who, without having the right to do so, would not pay a credit instalment due between 12 March 2020 and one month after the end of the state of health emergency (which is supposed to last two months as from 24 March 2020 but could be extended), could argue that the loan documents' acceleration clause and default interest clause (a liquidated damage clause) shall only take effect after that period pursuant to Ordinance No. 2020-306 of 25 March 2020, adopted further to the "emergency" Law No. 2020-290 of 23 March 2020.
A borrower who, without having the right to do so, would not pay a credit instalment due between 12 March 2020 and one month after the end of the state of health emergency (which is supposed to last two months as from 24 March 2020 but could be extended), could argue that the loan documents' acceleration clause and default interest clause (a liquidated damage clause) shall only take effect after that period pursuant to Ordinance No. 2020-306 of 25 March 2020, adopted further to the "emergency" Law No. 2020-290 of 23 March 2020.