On June 22, U.S. Circuit Judge Judge Jerry Smith issued a short, three-page opinion in the case Hidalgo County Emergency Service Foundation v. Carranza that appeared, at first blush, to be a death blow to many debtors' ability to obtain Paycheck Protection Program, or PPP, loans under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security, or CARES, Act.

In Lane v. Bank of New York Mellon (In re Lane), No. 18-60059, 2020 WL 2832270 (9th Cir. June 1, 2020), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was asked to decide whether a bankruptcy court may void a lien under section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code when a claim relating to the lien is disallowed because the creditor who filed the proof of claim did not prove that it was the person entitled to enforce the debt the lien secures. Employing a narrow reading of section 506(d), the Ninth Circuit answered the question in the negative.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit recently reversed a bankruptcy court’s disallowance of postpetition interest at the default contract rate, holding that “the bankruptcy court erred in applying a liquidated damages analysis and ruling the default interest rate was an unenforceable penalty,” and also erred in weighing “equitable considerations” to avoid enforcing the contractual default interest rate.

One of the landmark protections enacted by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security, or CARES, Act on March 27 was the Paycheck Protection Program, or PPP. Under the program, small businesses (e.g., those with fewer than 500 employees) — and certain other businesses in specific industries — are eligible to receive loans that will be fully forgiven if utilized under the terms of the program, including applying at least 75% of the funds received from the loans to payment of payroll expenses.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s holding that the contemporaneous exchange for new value defense to a preference action under § 547(c) applied to a creditor bank that released its liens for less than full payment.

In so ruling, the Eighth Circuit BAP held that the bankruptcy trustee could not recover two of the three payments that the debtor made to the bank during the 90-day pre-petition preference period.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently rejected a loan servicer’s appeal from a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s ruling to remand to the lower bankruptcy court a punitive damages award for alleged discharge violations.

In so ruling, the Court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction regarding the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s ruling as to the punitive damages award, but affirmed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s denial of the debtors’ motion for appellate attorney’s fees.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal of a consumer’s Truth in Lending Act (TILA) claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the claim was barred by the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the federal Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA).

A copy of the opinion in Shaw v. Bank of America is available at: Link to Opinion.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued an opinion on December 24, 2019, In re Homebanc Mortgage Crop., No. 18-2887, 2019 WL 7161215(3rd Cir. De. 24, 2019) that has significant consequences for participants in repurchases transactions. The court affirmed the lower court judgment, that the securities had been liquidated in good faith.

Facts

Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code is a safe harbor provision that establishes that a trustee or debtor-in-possession may not avoid a transfer “by or to... a financial institution.. in connection with a securities contract” other than under an intentional fraudulent conveyance theory. On December 19, 2019, the Second Circuit in Note Holders v.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently reversed the denial of a lender’s motion to compel arbitration in an adversary bankruptcy proceeding for allegedly violating the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), holding that — despite conflicting clauses in two different relevant agreements — the parties had entered into a valid arbitration agreement that delegated the threshold issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator.