If, like me, you have ever scratched your head in confusion while preparing your taxes and thought to yourself – “I can’t believe the IRS takes such an absurd position on xyz tax exemption I want to use – who comes up with these crazy positions?” – then you might take some pleasure in a recent opinion from Judge Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware calling an argument made by the IRS “strained and a bit confusing.” You read that right.

The U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral argument today inU.S. Bank National Association v. Village at Lakeridge (15-1509). At issue in the case is whether the appropriate standard of review for determining non-statutory insider status is the de novo standard of review applied by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 3rd, 7th and 10th Circuits, or the clearly erroneous standard of review adopted for the first time by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in Village at Lake Ridge.

In In re Short Bark Industries Inc., 17-11502 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017), Judge Kevin Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware read the Supreme Court’s holding in Jevic narrowly in connection with a settlement of a dispute on DIP financing.

The bankruptcy bar is abuzz following the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 15-649, 2017 BL 89680, 85 U.S.L.W. 4115 (Sup. Ct. March 22, 2017), holding that bankruptcy courts may not approve structured dismissals that do not adhere to the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.

In recent years, constructively fraudulent transfer claims asserted in bankruptcy cases, especially those arising from LBOs and similar shareholder transactions, have hit a major road block.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently issued an opinion that addresses, among other issues, the question of whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code preempts certain fraudulent transfer avoidance actions brought under state law. In re Physiotherapy Holdings Inc., No. 15-51238 (Bankr. D. Del. June 20, 2016).

Parties to all legal proceedings - including bankruptcy proceedings - are entitled to Constitutionally protected due process rights, including reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. In the bankruptcy context, the debtor must give known creditors reasonable notice of certain critical events, including the sale of the debtor’s assets and the deadline to file claims against the debtor.

The Bankruptcy Code sets forth the relative priority of claims against a debtor and the waterfall in which such claims are typically paid. In order for a court to confirm a plan over a dissenting class of creditors – what is commonly called a “cram-down” – the Bankruptcy Code demands thateither (i) the dissenting class receives the full value of its claim, or (ii) no classes junior to that class receive any property under the plan on account of their junior claims or interests. This is known as the “absolute priority rule.”