On October 17, 2022, Justice Andrea Masley of the NY Supreme Court issued a decision and order denying all but one of the motion to dismiss claims filed by Boardriders, Oaktree Capital (an equity holder, term lender, and “Sponsor” under the credit agreement), and an ad hoc group of lenders (the “Participating Lenders”) that participated in an “uptiering” transaction that included new money investments and roll-ups of existing term loan debt into new priming debt that would sit at the top of the company’s capital structure.

On October 14, 2022, the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Ultra Petroleum, granting favorable outcomes to “unimpaired” creditors that challenged the company’s plan of reorganization and argued for payment (i) of a ~$200 million make-whole and (ii) post-petition interest at the contractual rate, not the Federal Judgment Rate. At issue on appeal was the Chapter 11 plan proposed by the “massively solvent” debtors—Ultra Petroleum Corp. (HoldCo) and its affiliates, including subsidiary Ultra Resources, Inc.

On July 6, Delaware Bankruptcy Court Judge Craig T. Goldblatt issued a memorandum opinion in the bankruptcy cases of TPC Group, Inc., growing the corpus of recent court decisions tackling “uptiering” and other similar transactions that have been dubbed by some practitioners and investors as “creditor-on-creditor violence.” This topic has been a hot button issue for a few years, playing out in a number of high profile scenarios, from J.Crew and Travelport to Serta Simmons and TriMark, among others.

The Bankruptcy Protector

This term, Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan has authored a pair of opinions related to arbitration. The first of these decisions, Badgerow v. Walters, 20-1143, 142 S. Ct. 1310 (2022) came down on March 31, 2022, where Justice Kagan, writing for the 8/1 majority, held that a court must have an independent basis of federal jurisdiction to undertake a petition to confirm or vacate an arbitration award.

Section 105 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, titled “Power of Court,” is often cited and used as a “catch-all” provision when requesting certain relief or when a bankruptcy court enters an order granting (or denying) certain relief not prescribed by a particular provision of the Bankruptcy Code. That section provides that a “court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title . . .

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently issued an opinion that calls into question the long-held Barton doctrine following the dismissal of a bankruptcy case and thus the jurisdiction of that court. In Tufts v. Hay, No. 19-11496 --- F.3d ----, 2020 WL 6144563 (11th Cir. Oct. 20, 2020), the court considered where a litigant may bring suit against counsel appointed by a bankruptcy court after the bankruptcy case was dismissed.

On August 26, 2020, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Code does not require subordination agreements to be strictly enforced in order for a court to confirm a cramdown plan, so long as the plan does not discriminate unfairly.

On December 19, 2019, the Second Circuit held that appellants’ state law constructive fraudulent transfer claims were preempted by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbors that exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for

On January 14, 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a decision resolving the question of whether a motion for relief from the automatic stay constitutes a discrete dispute within the bankruptcy that creates a basis for a final appealable ruling, or whether it simply is a controversy that is part of the broader Chapter 11 case, such that appeals would not need to be taken until the conclusion of the Chapter 11 case.

In 2007, Philadelphia Entertainment and Development Partners, LP dba Foxwoods Casino Philadelphia (“Plaintiff”) secured a gaming license from Pennsylvania for $50,000,000 with the understanding that it open its casino business within one year. Plaintiff failed to do so and, despite a number of extensions, Pennsylvania cancelled and revoked the gaming license in December 2010. Without a gaming license, Plaintiff found itself in chapter 11 by spring of 2014.