On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated a standard to determine what claims may be barred against a purchaser of assets "free and clear" of claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighted procedural due process concerns with respect to enforcement.¹  The decision arose out of litigation regarding certain defects, including the well-known "ignition switch defect," affecting certain GM vehicles.  GM's successor (which acquired GM's assets in a section 363 sale in 2009) asserted that a "free and clear" provisi

On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it.  The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code.  In In re Tribune Co.

With the decision of 16 September 2015, No. 18131, the Court of Cassation settled a long-standing debate, ruling that the receiver can not terminate an agreement to sell real estate property, entered into by the company which is later declared bankrupt, if the purchaser has registered with the Land Registry, before bankruptcy, its claim to the Court to be transferred title to the property.

The immediate application of the new section no. 120 TUB and the scope of its anatocism prohibition is the centre of a case-law dispute which originated from a series of inhibitory proceedings promoted by a consumer association in order to make ascertain the unlawful capitalization practiced by Banks of the passive interests in bank accounts. Now that said interim proceedings has been defined a first summary can be drawn.

Two main interpretative options so far emerged: