Trademark licensees that file for bankruptcy protection face uncertainty concerning their ability to continue using trademarks that are crucial to their businesses. Some of this stems from an unsettled issue in the courts as to whether a licensee can assume a trademark license without the licensor’s consent. In In re Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc., 2015 BL 44152 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 20, 2015), a Delaware bankruptcy court reaffirmed that the ongoing controversy surrounding the “actual” versus “hypothetical” test for assumption of a trademark license has not abated.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit―in Rajala v. Gardner, 709 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 2013)―has joined the Second Circuit and departed from the Fifth Circuit by holding that an allegedly fraudulently transferred asset is not property of the estate until recovered pursuant to section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code and therefore is not covered by the automatic stay. According to the court, its decision “gives Congress’s chosen language its ordinary meaning, and abides by a rule against surplusage.”

In keeping with the courts’ narrow construction of what constitutes “substantial contribution” in a chapter 11 case, an Ohio bankruptcy court in In re AmFin Financial Corp., 2012 WL 652018 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2012), denied administrative- expense priority to the fees and expenses of the holders of approximately $100 million in senior notes (the “Senior Noteholders”) issued by debtor AmFin Financial Corporation (“AFC”).

A debtor's decision to assume or reject an executory contract is typically given deferential treatment by bankruptcy courts under a "business judgment" standard. Certain types of nondebtor parties to such contracts, however, have been afforded special protections. For example, in 1988, Congress added section 365(n) to the Bankruptcy Code, granting some intellectual property licensees the right to continued use of licensed property, notwithstanding a debtor's rejection of the underlying license agreement.