Confirmation of a chapter 11 plan providing for the reorganization or liquidation of a debtor is the culmination of the chapter 11 process. To promote the fundamental policy of finality in that process, the general rule is that a final confirmation order is inviolable. The absence of certainty that the transactions effectuated under a plan are valid and permanent would undermine chapter 11's fundamental purpose as a vehicle for rehabilitating ailing enterprises and providing debtors with a fresh start.

The U.S. Supreme Court handed down three bankruptcy rulings to finish the Term ended in July 2024. The decisions address the validity of nonconsensual third-party releases in chapter 11 plans, the standing of insurance companies to object to "insurance neutral" chapter 11 plans, and the remedy for overpayment of administrative fees in chapter 11 cases to the Office of the U.S. Trustee. We discuss each of them below.

U.S. Supreme Court Bars Nonconsensual Third-Party Releases in Chapter 11 Plans

The Bankruptcy Code invalidates "ipso facto" clauses in executory contracts or unexpired leases that purport to modify or terminate the contract or lease (or the debtor's rights or obligations under the contract or lease) based solely on the debtor's financial condition or the commencement of a bankruptcy case for the debtor. It also invalidates state law, rather than a contract, that purports to alter the property interests of the debtor. A more difficult situation arises when those interests are on the outer bounds of "property of the estate."

Election of Joe Graham to Partner

Joe Graham was elected partner in the New York office. This year, Joe played a leading role in the chapter 11 cases of Avaya, Benefytt and Diamond Sports. He regularly advises on out-of-court restructurings, bankruptcy litigation and distressed investments. Joe earned his J.D., magna cum laude, and his B.A. from the University of Notre Dame.

Kelley Cornish Inducted into “M&A Advisor Hall of Fame”

Bankruptcy trustees and chapter 11 debtors-in-possession ("DIPs") frequently seek to avoid fraudulent transfers and obligations under section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and state fraudulent transfer or other applicable nonbankruptcy laws because the statutory "look-back" period for avoidance under many nonbankruptcy laws exceeds the two-year period governing avoidance actions under section 548.

Exculpation clauses limiting the liability of certain entities for actions taken in connection with a bankruptcy case are a common feature of chapter 11 plans. However, courts disagree over the permitted scope of such clauses. They also disagree as to whether an order confirming a chapter 11 plan that includes exculpation and third-party release provisions is insulated from appellate review under the doctrine of "equitable mootness."

On April 19, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC that Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code is not jurisdictional. The decision requires parties timely to invoke that provision, or else risk forfeiting its protections. The decision also continues the Supreme Court’s trend of interpreting statutes to be non-jurisdictional (and thus waivable or forfeitable) in the absence of a clear congressional statement to the contrary.

Background

A handful of recent high-profile court rulings have considered whether a chapter 11 debtor is obligated to pay postpetition, pre-effective date interest ("pendency interest") to unsecured creditors to render their claims "unimpaired" under a chapter 11 plan in accordance with the pre-Bankruptcy Code common law "solvent-debtor" exception requiring a solvent debtor to pay pendency interest to unsecured creditors. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit weighed in on this question in In re LATAM Airlines Grp. S.A., 55 F.4th 377 (2d Cir. 2022).

On December 5, 2022, in In re Global Cord Blood Corp., 2022 WL 17478530 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2022) (“Global Cord”), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) denied recognition of a proceeding pending in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands (the “Cayman Proceeding” and the court, the “Cayman Court”) because it was more like a corporate governance and fraud remediation effort than a collective proceeding for the purpose of dealing with reorganization or liquidation, as Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code requires.