Secured lenders have welcomed a ruling recently handed down by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in the chapter 11 cases of Aéropostale, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively, "Aéropostale"). In In re Aéropostale, Inc., 2016 BL 279439 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2016), Bankruptcy Judge Sean H.

On July 26, 2016, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that the Bankruptcy Code section 546(e) "safe harbor" applicable to constructive fraudulent transfers that are settlement payments made in connection with securities contracts does not protect "transfers that are simply conducted through financial institutions (or the other entities named in section 546(e)), where the entity is neither the debtor nor the transferee but only the conduit."FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 2016 BL 243677.

In an earlier blog piece we reported on the Third Circuit’s 2015 decision in In re Jevic Holding Corp. where the Court approved a settlement, implemented through a structured dismissal, which allowed junior creditors to receive a distribution prior to senior creditors being paid in full.

While secured creditors are entitled to special rights in bankruptcy, those rights may differ depending on whether creditors have a statutory or consensual lien on their collateral. This is primarily because section 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in part, that “property acquired by the estate or by the debtor after the commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting from any security agreement . . .

On November 17, 2016, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued a highly anticipated ruling in the chapter 11 reorganization of Energy Future Holdings Corp. ("EFH"), invalidating one of the aspects of EFH’s confirmed chapter 11 plan. InDel. Tr. Co. v. Energy Future Intermediate Holding Co. LLC (In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.), 842 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2016), a three-judge panel of the Third Circuit reversed lower court rulings disallowing the claims of EFH’s noteholders for hundreds of millions of dollars in make-whole premiums allegedly due under their indentures.

It is a familiar scenario: a company is on the verge of bankruptcy, bound by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and unable to negotiate a new agreement.  However, this time, an analysis of this distressed scenario prompted a new question: does it matter if the CBA is already expired, i.e., does the Bankruptcy Code distinguish between a CBA that expires pre-petition versus one that has not lapsed?

It is said that muddy water is best cleared by leaving it be.  The Supreme Court’s December 4 decision to review the legality of Puerto Rico’s local bankruptcy law, the Recovery Act, despite a well-reasoned First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion affirming the U.S. District Court in San Juan’s decision voiding the Recovery Act on the grounds that it conflicts with Section 903 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, suggests, at a minimum, that at least four of the Justices deemed the questions raised too interesting to let the First Circuit have the last word.

Sales of assets pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code or pursuant to a plan of reorganization provide a number of benefits to a purchaser, but they also present a number of potential impediments, particularly to purchasers who are not familiar with the bankruptcy sale process.

The Bankruptcy Code generally permits intellectual property licensees to continue using licensed property despite a licensor’s bankruptcy filing. However, because the “intellectual property” definition in the Bankruptcy Code does not include “trademarks,” courts have varied on whether trademark licensees receive similar protection. A New Jersey bankruptcy court recently grappled with this issue, concluding that trademark licensees may retain their trademark rights.

In a recent bench decision in In re MPM Silicones, LLC et al., Case No. 14-22503-RDD (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. August 26, 2014), the Bankruptcy Court considered bondholders’ right to recover make-whole premiums (premiums paid for early repayment of debt) upon the payment of accelerated debt following the borrower’s bankruptcy default. The Court ruled that the governing loan documents lacked specific language requiring a make-whole premium upon acceleration.