A bedrock principle underlying chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is that creditors, shareholders, and other stakeholders should be provided with adequate information to make an informed decision to either accept or reject a chapter 11 plan. For this reason, the Bankruptcy Code provides that any "solicitation" of votes for or against a plan must be preceded or accompanied by stakeholders' receipt of a "disclosure statement" approved by the bankruptcy court explaining the background of the case as well as the key provisions of the chapter 11 plan.

Judgment was handed down last week on the substantial directors' duties and wrongful trading claims brought against former directors of various BHS companies^[1].

In Short

The Situation: The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether § 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code, which limits a party's ability to undo an asset transfer made to a good-faith purchaser in a bankruptcy case, is jurisdictional.

We are increasingly seeing requests from borrowers to carve-out assets from the scope of a lender's otherwise all asset English security package. Whilst there may be commercially sensible reasons for this request, lenders should be aware of the potential impact on their enforcement rights before agreeing to this.

Since the introduction of the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (CIGA) and the creation of the new Part 26A restructuring plan procedure, questions have been raised about whether the cost of using such a procedure would restrict its use to larger, better capitalised companies.

The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to assume, assume and assign, or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases is an important tool designed to promote a "fresh start" for debtors and to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. However, the Bankruptcy Code establishes strict requirements for the assumption or assignment of contracts and leases.

The long awaited Sequana Supreme Court judgment[1] has provided some welcome clarity around the duties of the directors of a company in the "twilight zone" – i.e. where the company is facing financial difficulties.

As outlined in our previous briefing note on the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, a new restructuring tool was introduced in June 2020 in the form of the Part A1 free-standing moratorium (the "Moratorium").

The High Court has dismissed a challenge to Caffe Nero's company voluntary arrangement (CVA) in Young v Nero Holdings Limited. The Applicant in the proceedings, Mr Young, was a landlord of premises let to the First Respondent, Nero Holdings Limited (the Company) and challenged the Company's CVA under s 6(1)(a) and (b) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the Act).

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, legislation was introduced during 2020 to prevent creditors filing statutory demands and winding up petitions on the basis of their debtor's inability to pay its debts, unless it could be shown that non-payment was not a result of the pandemic. These temporary measures had been extended a number of times during the pandemic as businesses continued to suffer the effects of multiple lockdowns and trading restrictions, but are now gradually being phased out.