A bedrock principle underlying chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is that creditors, shareholders, and other stakeholders should be provided with adequate information to make an informed decision to either accept or reject a chapter 11 plan. For this reason, the Bankruptcy Code provides that any "solicitation" of votes for or against a plan must be preceded or accompanied by stakeholders' receipt of a "disclosure statement" approved by the bankruptcy court explaining the background of the case as well as the key provisions of the chapter 11 plan.
The High Court recently issued its ruling in the matter of Re Avanti Communications Limited (in administration). It is the first major case since the pivotal 2005 House of Lords decision of Re Spectrum Plus to examine the characteristics of fixed and floating charges.
Key points
In Short
The Situation: The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether § 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code, which limits a party's ability to undo an asset transfer made to a good-faith purchaser in a bankruptcy case, is jurisdictional.
In the current times of financial stress, a borrower seeking to renegotiate or refinance existing financing arrangements may be asked by its lender to enhance or refresh its security package through the grant of a new floating charge.
The question of whether a floating charge can be avoided due to section 245 of the Insolvency Act 1986 ("IA 1986") can arise in such a context.
Void floating charges under section 245 of the IA 1986
The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to assume, assume and assign, or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases is an important tool designed to promote a "fresh start" for debtors and to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. However, the Bankruptcy Code establishes strict requirements for the assumption or assignment of contracts and leases.
The issue
A "no action" clause will appear in almost all English law-governed bond trust deeds.
A no action clause provides that a bondholder (or anyone entitled to payments on the bonds) cannot, initially, proceed directly against the issuer. Instead, the right to bring a cause of action resides with the trustee and it is only if the trustee, having become bound to take action, fails to do so within a reasonable time (with the failure continuing) that a bondholder can then itself proceed directly against the issuer.
The High Court has, for the first time since the introduction of the legislation in June 2020, refused to sanction a cross-class cram-down restructuring plan under Part 26A of the Companies Act. In In the matter of Hurricane Energy Plc [2021] EWHC 1759 (Ch), the court rejected a plan supported by bondholders because it had not been shown that the opposing shareholders had no better alternative prospects (i.e., the ‘no worse off condition’ had not been met).
Madoff
On April 19, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal of a landmark 2019 decision issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit regarding the applicability of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor for certain securities, commodity, or forward contract payments to prevent the avoidance in bankruptcy of $8.3 billion in payments made to the shareholders of Tribune Co. as part of its 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO").
On October 26, 2020, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas issued a long-awaited ruling on whether natural gas exploration and production company Ultra Petroleum Corp. ("UPC") must pay a make-whole premium to noteholders under its confirmed chapter 11 plan and whether the noteholders are entitled to postpetition interest on their claims pursuant to the "solvent-debtor exception." On remand from the U.S.