When a company is in financial distress, its directors will face difficult choices. Should they trade on to trade out of the company's financial difficulties or should they file for insolvency? If they delay filing and the company goes into administration or liquidation, will the directors be at risk from a wrongful trading claim by the subsequently appointed liquidator? Once in liquidation, will they be held to have separately breached their duties as directors and face a misfeasance claim? If they file precipitously, will creditors complain they did not do enough to save the business?
A bedrock principle underlying chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is that creditors, shareholders, and other stakeholders should be provided with adequate information to make an informed decision to either accept or reject a chapter 11 plan. For this reason, the Bankruptcy Code provides that any "solicitation" of votes for or against a plan must be preceded or accompanied by stakeholders' receipt of a "disclosure statement" approved by the bankruptcy court explaining the background of the case as well as the key provisions of the chapter 11 plan.
In Short
The Situation: The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether § 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code, which limits a party's ability to undo an asset transfer made to a good-faith purchaser in a bankruptcy case, is jurisdictional.
The UK High Court has considered and granted permission for a so called “credit bid” in an application by the Special Administrators of Sova Capital Ltd (in special administration) for a substantial portfolio of illiquid Russian securities. The transaction structure, involving the transfer of securities in exchange for the release of a £233m claim against the estate, is unprecedented in the UK where ‘credit bidding’ has no technical recognition.
The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to assume, assume and assign, or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases is an important tool designed to promote a "fresh start" for debtors and to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. However, the Bankruptcy Code establishes strict requirements for the assumption or assignment of contracts and leases.
Company directors who act in breach of their statutory and fiduciary duties can face disqualification for up to 15 years pursuant to the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA). Prior to 15 February 2022, civil disqualification proceedings on the grounds of unfitness could only be brought in relation to directors of 'live' companies under s.8 CDDA (where the court retains a discretion whether or not to disqualify) or those subject to insolvency proceedings under s.6 CDDA (where the court is obliged to exercise its power to disqualify).
Madoff
On April 19, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal of a landmark 2019 decision issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit regarding the applicability of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor for certain securities, commodity, or forward contract payments to prevent the avoidance in bankruptcy of $8.3 billion in payments made to the shareholders of Tribune Co. as part of its 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO").
On October 26, 2020, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas issued a long-awaited ruling on whether natural gas exploration and production company Ultra Petroleum Corp. ("UPC") must pay a make-whole premium to noteholders under its confirmed chapter 11 plan and whether the noteholders are entitled to postpetition interest on their claims pursuant to the "solvent-debtor exception." On remand from the U.S.