Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code offers powerful protection for good-faith purchasers in bankruptcy sales because it limits appellate review of an approved sale, irrespective of the legal merits of the appeal. Specifically, it provides that the reversal or modification of an order approving the sale of assets in bankruptcy does not affect the validity of the sale to a good-faith purchaser unless the party challenging the sale obtains a stay pending its appeal of the order. That is, section 363(m) renders an appeal "statutorily moot" absent a stay of the sale order.
The practice of conferring "derivative standing" on official creditors' committees or individual creditors to assert claims on behalf of a bankruptcy estate in cases where the debtor or a bankruptcy trustee is unwilling or unable to do so is well-established. However, until recently, Delaware bankruptcy courts have uniformly limited the practice in cases where applicable non-bankruptcy law provides that creditors do not have standing to bring claims on behalf of certain entities.
The Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly authorize the equitable remedy of "substantive consolidation"—i.e., treating the assets and liabilities of two or more related entities as if they belonged to a single, consolidated bankruptcy estate. However, it is well recognized that a bankruptcy court has the authority to order such relief under appropriate circumstances in the exercise of its broad equitable powers when each of the original entities are already debtors subject to the court's jurisdiction.
To shield bankruptcy trustees and certain other entities from litigation arising from actions taken in their official capacity, the "Barton doctrine"—now more than a century old—provides that such litigation may be commenced only with the authority of the appointing court. The doctrine has certain exceptions, one of which—the "ultra vires exception"—was recently examined by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as an apparent matter of first impression.
The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession to sell assets of the bankruptcy estate "free and clear" of "any interest in property" asserted by a non-debtor is an important tool designed to maximize the value of the estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Illinois recently examined whether such interests include "successor liability" claims that might otherwise be asserted against the purchaser of a debtor's assets. In In re Norrenberns Foods, Inc., 642 B.R. 825 (Bankr. S.D. Ill.
Nine Point Energy Holdings, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively, "Nine Point" or "Nine Point debtors") constituted an oil and gas production and exploration company that sought to reorganize in chapter 11 through a going concern sale of substantially all of their assets. To maximize value, Nine Point sought to sell those assets free and clear of its midstream services contracts, which included provisions that prevented Nine Point from acquiring midstream services from anyone other than its counterparty, Caliber North Dakota, LLC ("Caliber").
In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.
In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina
It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .
I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.