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The practice of conferring "derivative standing" on official creditors' committees or individual creditors to assert claims on behalf of a bankruptcy estate in cases where the debtor or a bankruptcy trustee is unwilling or unable to do so is well-established. However, until recently, Delaware bankruptcy courts have uniformly limited the practice in cases where applicable non-bankruptcy law provides that creditors do not have standing to bring claims on behalf of certain entities.

Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code offers powerful protection for good-faith purchasers in bankruptcy sales because it limits appellate review of an approved sale, irrespective of the legal merits of the appeal. Specifically, it provides that the reversal or modification of an order approving the sale of assets in bankruptcy does not affect the validity of the sale to a good-faith purchaser unless the party challenging the sale obtains a stay pending its appeal of the order. That is, section 363(m) renders an appeal "statutorily moot" absent a stay of the sale order.

The Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly authorize the equitable remedy of "substantive consolidation"—i.e., treating the assets and liabilities of two or more related entities as if they belonged to a single, consolidated bankruptcy estate. However, it is well recognized that a bankruptcy court has the authority to order such relief under appropriate circumstances in the exercise of its broad equitable powers when each of the original entities are already debtors subject to the court's jurisdiction.

To shield bankruptcy trustees and certain other entities from litigation arising from actions taken in their official capacity, the "Barton doctrine"—now more than a century old—provides that such litigation may be commenced only with the authority of the appointing court. The doctrine has certain exceptions, one of which—the "ultra vires exception"—was recently examined by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as an apparent matter of first impression.

If a debt arises from a contract that contains an exclusive jurisdiction clause (EJC) in favour of a foreign court, how will the Hong Kong court deal with a bankruptcy petition based on that debt? A highly anticipated judgment from Hong Kong’s highest court suggests that the bankruptcy petition will likely be dismissed, and that the foreign EJC will be given effect. But, as we will discuss below, the Court seems to leave other possibilities open, depending on the facts in a particular case.

The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession to sell assets of the bankruptcy estate "free and clear" of "any interest in property" asserted by a non-debtor is an important tool designed to maximize the value of the estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Illinois recently examined whether such interests include "successor liability" claims that might otherwise be asserted against the purchaser of a debtor's assets. In In re Norrenberns Foods, Inc., 642 B.R. 825 (Bankr. S.D. Ill.

A recent Hong Kong Court of Appeal decision examined a creditor’s right to commence bankruptcy/insolvency proceedings where the petition debt arises from an agreement containing an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of a foreign court: Guy Kwok-Hung Lam v Tor Asia Credit Master Fund LP [2022] HKCA 1297.

Historically, the Hong Kong courts have generally recognised foreign insolvency proceedings commenced in the jurisdiction in which the company is incorporated. This may no longer be the case in Hong Kong following the recent decision of Provisional Liquidator of Global Brands Group Holding Ltd v Computershare Hong Kong Trustees Ltd [2022] HKCFI 1789 (Global Brands).

Historically, the common law has only recognised foreign insolvency proceedings commenced in the jurisdiction in which the company is incorporated. This may no longer be the case in Hong Kong. Going forward, a Hong Kong court will now recognise foreign insolvency proceedings in the jurisdiction of the company’s “centre of main interests” (COMI). Indeed, it will not be sufficient, nor will it be necessary, that the foreign insolvency process is conducted in a company’s place of incorporation.