Introduction
Derivative Standing
Dura Automotive
The Bankruptcy Court's Ruling
The McClatchy Company
Outlook
The practice of conferring "derivative standing" on official creditors' committees to assert claims on behalf of a bankruptcy estate in cases where the debtor or a bankruptcy trustee is unwilling or unable to do so is a well-established means of generating value for the estate from litigation recoveries. However, in a series of recent decisions, the Delaware bankruptcy courts have limited the practice in cases where applicable non-bankruptcy state law provides that creditors do not have standing to bring claims on behalf of certain entities.
The economic hardships brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic have impacted companies globally, leading many to consider both in-court and out-of-court restructurings. Because this trend will likely continue as the long-term effects of COVID-19 play out, companies with arbitration clauses in their commercial agreements may wish to consider the impact of insolvency on their options for pursuing pending or future arbitrations.
The Situation: In the past few weeks, due to the severe impact of the COVID-19 crisis on non-essential businesses forced to close and terminate employees after filing for chapter 11 protection, bankruptcy courts have been confronted with requests by debtors to temporarily suspend their bankruptcy cases using the courts' equitable powers and a seldom-used provision of the Bankruptcy Code: 11 U.S.C. § 305(a).
In This Issue:
U.S. Supreme Court: Creditors May Immediately Appeal Denials of Automatic-Stay Relief
In McKillen v. Wallace (In re Irish Bank Resolution Corp. Ltd.), 2019 WL 4740249 (D. Del. Sept. 27, 2019), the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware had an opportunity to consider, as an apparent matter of first impression, whether the U.S. common law "Barton Doctrine" applies extraterritorially. One of the issues considered by the district court on appeal was whether parties attempting to sue a foreign representative in a chapter 15 case must first obtain permission to sue from the foreign court that appointed the foreign representative.
A survey of recent rulings by judges from the bankruptcy courts for the Southern District of New York and the District of Delaware suggests that judges in these districts have very different views about the nature and extent of “consensual” third-party releases that may be approved in a given case. The data also indicates that their thinking on this issue continues to evolve as they confront new arguments.
In In re O’Reilly, 598 B.R. 784 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2019), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied the petition of a foreign bankruptcy trustee for recognition under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code of a debtor’s Bahamian bankruptcy case. Although the Bahamian bankruptcy was otherwise eligible for chapter 15 recognition, the U.S.
For more than a century, courts in England and Wales have refused to recognize or enforce foreign court judgments or proceedings that discharge or compromise debts governed by English law. In accordance with a rule (the "Gibbs Rule") stated in an 1890 decision by the English Court of Appeal, creditors holding debt governed by English law may still sue to recover the full amount of their debts in England even if such debts have been discharged or modified in connection with a non-U.K.
U.S. courts have a long-standing tradition of recognizing or enforcing the laws and court rulings of other nations as an exercise of international "comity." Prior to the enactment of chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code in 2005, the procedure for obtaining comity from a U.S. court in cases involving a foreign bankruptcy or insolvency case was haphazard and unpredictable. A ruling recently handed down by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois indicates that the enactment of chapter 15 was a game changer in this context. In Halo Creative & Design Ltd. v.