Every now and then we get a bankruptcy opinion declaring a rule with broad application that, (i) may make sense is specific situations, but (ii) is a terrible result for others.

Here’s an Exhibit A opinion for such a proposition: Reinhart Foodservice LLC v. Schlundt, Case No. 21-cv-1027 in the U.S. District Court for Eastern Wisconsin, (Doc. 12, issued October 27, 2022).

The Facts

Even before chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 2005 to govern cross-border bankruptcy proceedings, the enforceability of a foreign court order approving a restructuring plan that modified or discharged U.S. law-governed debt was well recognized under principles of international comity. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently reaffirmed this concept in In re Modern Land (China) Co., Ltd., 641 B.R. 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Poor Chicago. 

Unlike the result for Chicago’s traffic ticket income in Fulton v. Chicago, the U.S. Supreme Court refuses to rescue Chicago in City of Chicago v. Mance (Case No. 22-268; Cert. denied, 11/21/2022).[Fn. 1]

Four decades and several years ago, Congress repeals the Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and replaces it with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, aka the “Bankruptcy Code.”[Fn. 1]

A decade later, Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court are still disparaging the new Bankruptcy Code as the “sweeping changes Congress instituted in 1978” and “the radical reforms of 1978.”[Fn. 2]

Every now and then we get an example of how a process should work.

That’s exactly what we have, regarding confirmation of a contested Subchapter V plan, in the case of In re Lapeer Aviation, Inc., Case No. 21-31500 in the Eastern Michigan Bankruptcy Court.

In an opinion issued October 12, 2022, (Doc. 264), the Lapeer Court declares that, (i) most of the plan confirmation standards are satisfied, but (ii) the plan is deficient under two confirmation standards and, therefore, cannot be confirmed.

During a November 9, 2022, hearing on summary judgment motions in the Hertz bankruptcy, Delaware Bankruptcy Judge Mary F. Walrath issues the following oral ruling:

As discussed in previous installments of this White Paper series, the Lummis-Gillibrand Responsible Financial Innovation Act (the “Bill”)¹ proposes a comprehensive statutory and regulatory framework in an effort to bring stability to the digital asset market. One area of proposed change relates to how digital assets and digital asset exchanges would be treated in bankruptcy. If enacted, the Bill would significantly alter the status quo from a bankruptcy perspective

OVERVIEW OF DIGITAL ASSETS IN BANKRUPTCY

The case is Wells v. McCallister, Case No. 21-1448 in the United States Supreme Court.

The question presented is:

• whether a debtor’s homestead exemption, existing on the date of bankruptcy filing, can vanish if the debtor sells the homestead during the bankruptcy and does not promptly reinvest the proceeds in another homestead.

The Petition for writ of certiorari explains:

For some reason, there is a fascination out there (not sure where, exactly) with having every assignment for benefit of creditors (“ABC”) supervised by a court from the get-go. 

This fascination suggests that every ABC effort requires court action and judicial approvals, from the beginning and throughout the assignment, to assure that everything about the ABC and its administration is on the up-and-up.

Startling and Puzzling

This fascination is both startling and puzzling.  Here are some reasons why.

In its Siegel v. Fitzgerald opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court declares that disparate quarterly fee amounts between U.S. Trustee and Bankruptcy Administrator districts are unconstitutional, under the uniformity requirement of the U.S. Constitution’s bankruptcy clause.

The most recent fallout from that opinion is the following docket entry by the U.S. Supreme Court in a different case with the same issues: