In bankruptcy cases under chapter 11, debtors sometimes opt for a "structured dismissal" when a consensual plan of reorganization or liquidation cannot be reached or conversion to chapter 7 would be too costly. In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions in structured dismissals which violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."

In Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner, 779 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision that transfers of trademark patents were avoidable under section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Minnesota state law because they were made with the intent to defraud creditors.

La Sentencia del Tribunal General del TJUE de 8 de abril de 2014 (asunto T-319/11), resuelve el re- curso de anulación parcial interpuesto por ABN Amro Group NV contra la Decisión 2011/823/UE, de la Comisión, que le impuso la prohibición de adquirir empresas de cualquier sector como una de las condiciones para considerar compatible con el mercado interior la ayuda pública que recibió del Estado holandés. La entidad ABN Amro había recibido ayuda pública para su recapitalización de entre 4.200 y 5.450 millones de euros, así como una ayuda de liquidez de 7.170 millones de euros.

El Real Decreto Ley 8/2013, de 28 de junio, de medidas urgentes contra la morosidad de las administraciones públicas y de apoyo a entidades locales con problemas financieros (publicado en el BOE de 19 de junio, convalidado por acuerdo del Congreso de los Diputados de 17 de julio), recoge una serie de medidas extraordinarias para ayudar a las Administraciones autonómicas y locales a reducir su deuda comercial acumulada.

Yes it can, according to the most recent judgments of the Spanish high courts. The question was addressed in several Judgments issued by the High Court (HC) of Castilla-La Mancha (amongst others, the Judgment issued on 11 February 2013, in Appeal no. 320/2012, and the Judgment issued on 12 February 2013 on Appeal no. 321/2012) and by the High Court (HC) of Madrid in its Judgment no. 41/2012 of 21 January.

Sí se puede, según pronunciamientos recientes de los Tribunales Superiores de Justicia. Se trata de varias Sentencias dictadas por el Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha (entre ellas, la Sentencia de 11 de febrero de 2013, recurso n.º 320/2012, y la de12 de febrero de 2013, recurso n.º 321/2012), y del Auto del TSJ de Madrid número 41/2012, de 21 de enero.

The U.S. Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2012 WL 1912197 (May 29, 2012), held that a debtor may not confirm a chapter 11 "cramdown" plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of existing liens, but does not permit a secured creditor to credit-bid at the sale. The unanimous ruling written by Justice Scalia (with Justice Kennedy recused) resolved a split among the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits.