In bankruptcy cases under chapter 11, debtors sometimes opt for a "structured dismissal" when a consensual plan of reorganization or liquidation cannot be reached or conversion to chapter 7 would be too costly. In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions in structured dismissals which violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules.
On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.
On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."
In Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner, 779 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision that transfers of trademark patents were avoidable under section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Minnesota state law because they were made with the intent to defraud creditors.
Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code provides mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency. On Oct. 6, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Jaffé v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., denied review of a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, upholding a bankruptcy court’s determination that a foreign debtor in a Chapter 15 case could not terminate its intellectual property licenses under German law, where such action would deprive the licensees of the debtor’s U.S.
In an important recent decision, United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., et al.,1 in which Pepper represented the prevailing party, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that supplemental unemployment compensation benefits (SUB payments) paid by a bankrupt company to its former employees were not wages subject to taxation under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA).
In In reAm. Capital Equip., LLC1 the Third Circuit addressed the issue of whether a bankruptcy court has the authority to determine at the disclosure statement stage that a Chapter 11 plan is unconfirmable without holding a confirmation hearing. The court held that when a plan is patently unconfirmable, so that no dispute of material fact remains and defects cannot be cured by creditor voting, a bankruptcy court is authorized to convert the case to Chapter 7 without holding a confirmation hearing. Am.
The U.S. Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2012 WL 1912197 (May 29, 2012), held that a debtor may not confirm a chapter 11 "cramdown" plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of existing liens, but does not permit a secured creditor to credit-bid at the sale. The unanimous ruling written by Justice Scalia (with Justice Kennedy recused) resolved a split among the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits.
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that debtors may not obtain confirmation of a Chapter 11 cramdown plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of a creditor’s lien but does not permit the creditor to credit-bid at the sale. InRadlax Gateway Hotel, LLC et al. v.