In bankruptcy cases under chapter 11, debtors sometimes opt for a "structured dismissal" when a consensual plan of reorganization or liquidation cannot be reached or conversion to chapter 7 would be too costly. In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions in structured dismissals which violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."

In Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner, 779 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision that transfers of trademark patents were avoidable under section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Minnesota state law because they were made with the intent to defraud creditors.

On 11 September 2014, the Supreme Court of New South Wales delivered judgment in Allco Funds Management Limited (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (In Liquidation) v Trust Company (RE Services) Limited (in its capacity as responsible entity and trustee of the Australian Wholesale Property Fund) [2014] NSWSC 1251.

The decision reminds directors of the risks associated with their involvement in transactions where they are in a position of conflict.

BACKGROUND

In the decision of JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association v Fletcher; Grant Samuel Corporate Finance Pty Limited v Fletcher [2014] NSWCA 31, the Court of Appeal of New South Wales confirmed that liquidators may apply under rule 36.16(2)(b) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) to further extend the time within which they may bring voidable transactions proceedings.  We considered the first instance judgment in a

The recent New South Wales Supreme Court (Court) decision in Plaza West Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (subject to a deed of company arrangement) [2013] NSWSC 168 involved an application to terminate the winding up of a company subject to a deed of company arrangement (DOCA) and emphasised the importance of comprehensive reports from the company’s administrators and experts, in deciding that application.

Background

The Facts

In this case the liquidators of Octaviar Administration had obtained an extension to the time for them to bring voidable transaction proceedings under section 588FF(1) of the Corporations Act (Extension Order). Before the expiration of the Extension Order, the liquidators sought a further extension under s588FF(3)(b) or, alternatively, asked the Court to vary the date in the Extension Order pursuant to the Court’s procedural powers under r 36.16 of Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR).

The U.S. Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2012 WL 1912197 (May 29, 2012), held that a debtor may not confirm a chapter 11 "cramdown" plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of existing liens, but does not permit a secured creditor to credit-bid at the sale. The unanimous ruling written by Justice Scalia (with Justice Kennedy recused) resolved a split among the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits.