In bankruptcy cases under chapter 11, debtors sometimes opt for a "structured dismissal" when a consensual plan of reorganization or liquidation cannot be reached or conversion to chapter 7 would be too costly. In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions in structured dismissals which violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."

In Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner, 779 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision that transfers of trademark patents were avoidable under section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Minnesota state law because they were made with the intent to defraud creditors.

This case highlights that the fiduciary duty to avoid conflicts of interest in particular will be strictly adhered to, with questions of fairness or unfairness of the relevant transaction being irrelevant.  Directors are reminded of the need to take great care to manage potential risks when involved in transactions in which they are acting as director of more than one company.  In particular, directors should check the rules in the companies’ constitutions around conflict of interest and if there is any concern, disclose their interest and seek approval of the companie

The Court found that the appointment of voluntary administrators to a company constituted oppressive conduct under section 232 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in circumstances where it was part of a clear strategy by the controlling shareholder to gain control of the company’s business, to the exclusion of the minority shareholders.  This case provides some useful observations on the operation of section 232, particularly around action by a parent company “of the affairs of” a subsidiary. 

The Court refused to declare an appointment of administrators invalid under section 447C of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) on the basis of a previous purportedly invalid removal of a director and alleged insufficient grounds to establish that the company was, or was likely to become insolvent.  This case illustrates the Court’s willingness to overlook technical anomalies in exercising its discretion under section 447C where the end result for the company would be the same, and a broad approach in assessing whether there are reasonable grounds to form a view that a company

This case serves as an important reminder that board appointments should not be taken lightly - even as a “personal favour”.  Directors should ensure that they are sufficiently abreast of the affairs of their companies and actively involved in their management.  An argument that a director was “not really involved” in management is unlikely to find favour when the company finds itself in strife.

This decision is a testament to the flexibility of schemes of arrangement in Australia as a means of effecting settlements with a company’s creditors as well as third parties such as the company’s insurers. The Federal Court also demonstrated its propensity to take a liberal interpretation of what constitutes a “compromise or arrangement” to enliven its jurisdiction to convene a meeting of creditors for the purpose of considering a proposed scheme of arrangement.