On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court held in City of Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U.S. __ (2021), that a creditor in possession of a debtor's property does not violate the automatic stay, specifically section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, by retaining the property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The Court's decision provides important guidance to bankruptcy courts, practitioners, and parties on the scope of the automatic stay's requirements.
In the latest chapter of more than a decade of litigation involving efforts to recover fictitious profits paid to certain customers of Bernard Madoff's defunct brokerage firm as part of the largest Ponzi scheme in history, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, 976 F.3d 184 (2d Cir.
In Short
The Situation: Circuit courts were split on whether mere retention by a creditor of estate property violates the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay, under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). The U.S. Supreme Court considered the question inCity of Chicago v. Fulton, in which the City of Chicago had refused to return debtors' vehicles after they filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions.
The ability of a bankruptcy trustee to avoid certain transfers of a debtor's property and to recover the property or its value from the transferees is an essential tool in maximizing the value of a bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. However, a ruling recently handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit could, if followed by other courts, curtail a trustee's avoidance and recovery powers. In Rajala v. Spencer Fane LLP (In re Generation Resources Holding Co.), 964 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 2020), reh'g denied, No.
Introduction
Derivative Standing
Dura Automotive
The Bankruptcy Court's Ruling
The McClatchy Company
Outlook
The practice of conferring "derivative standing" on official creditors' committees to assert claims on behalf of a bankruptcy estate in cases where the debtor or a bankruptcy trustee is unwilling or unable to do so is a well-established means of generating value for the estate from litigation recoveries. However, in a series of recent decisions, the Delaware bankruptcy courts have limited the practice in cases where applicable non-bankruptcy state law provides that creditors do not have standing to bring claims on behalf of certain entities.
The Situation: In the past few weeks, due to the severe impact of the COVID-19 crisis on non-essential businesses forced to close and terminate employees after filing for chapter 11 protection, bankruptcy courts have been confronted with requests by debtors to temporarily suspend their bankruptcy cases using the courts' equitable powers and a seldom-used provision of the Bankruptcy Code: 11 U.S.C. § 305(a).
In This Issue:
U.S. Supreme Court: Creditors May Immediately Appeal Denials of Automatic-Stay Relief
In McKillen v. Wallace (In re Irish Bank Resolution Corp. Ltd.), 2019 WL 4740249 (D. Del. Sept. 27, 2019), the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware had an opportunity to consider, as an apparent matter of first impression, whether the U.S. common law "Barton Doctrine" applies extraterritorially. One of the issues considered by the district court on appeal was whether parties attempting to sue a foreign representative in a chapter 15 case must first obtain permission to sue from the foreign court that appointed the foreign representative.
——新修订将如何影响上市公司重组
作为打击壳股活动的一系列举措之一，香港联合交易所有限公司（以下简称“联交所”）修订了《香港联合交易所有限公司证券上市规则》（以下简称“《上市规则》”）中的大量条文，并发布了相关指引信。最新修订的条文于2019年10月1日生效，修订主要关于借壳上市和持续上市准则有关。其他已于2018年开始生效修订的条文与除牌机制和融资规则有关。除此之外，联交所逐渐加强了对新上市申请人的上市适合性审查。尽管这些修订主要针对壳股活动，但是也会影响其他重组活动，包括上市公司破产重组。
我们将在本文中分享对上述修订及其对上市公司破产重组的影响的看法。本文不讨论《上市规则》中所有经过修订的条文，仅关注某些会影响上市公司重组的特定条文。
除牌制度
在2018年8月以前，根据《上市规则》第17项应用指引的规定，除牌程序由三阶段组成。但在2018年8月以后，除牌程序简单化，上市公司持续停牌18个月，联交所即可将其除牌。