In the November/December 2014 edition of the Business Restructuring Review, we discussed a decision handed down by the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware addressing the meaning of “unreasonably small capital” in the context of constructively fraudulent transfer avoidance litigation. In Whyte ex rel. SemGroup Litig. Trust v.

"In Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015), a divided U.S. Supreme Court resolved the circuit split regarding whether a bankruptcy court may, with the consent of the litigants, adjudicate a claim that, though statutorily denominated as “core,” is not otherwise constitutionally determinable by a bankruptcy judge. The majority held that so long as consent—whether express or implied—is “knowing and voluntary,” Article III of the U.S. Constitution is not violated by a bankruptcy court’s adjudication of such a claim.

In Hosking v. TPG Capital Management LP (In re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxemburg) II SCA), 2015 BL 21823 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2015), the U.S. bankruptcy court presiding over the chapter 15 case of London-based Hellas Telecommunications (Luxemburg) II SCA ("Hellas II"), which formerly owned one of the largest mobile phone operators in Greece, dismissed fraudulent transfer claims asserted by Hellas II's U.K. liquidators against private equity giants TPG Capital Management LP and Apax Partners LLP as well as various affiliates (collectively, the "defendants").

The meaning of "unreasonably small capital" in the context of constructively fraudulent transfer avoidance litigation is not spelled out in the Bankruptcy Code. As a result, bankruptcy courts have been called upon to fashion their own definitions of the term. Nonetheless, the courts that have considered the issue have mostly settled on some general concepts in fashioning such a definition. In Whyte ex rel. SemGroup Litig. Trust v. Ritchie SG Holdings, LLC (In re SemCrude, LP), 2014 BL 272343 (D. Del. Sept.