On April 7, 2016, Quicksilver Resources Inc. ("Quicksilver") announced that it closed the sale of its U.S. assets for $245 million to BlueStone Natural Resources II ("BlueStone") in connection with Quicksilver's bankruptcy cases and pursuant to an Asset Purchase Agreement that was approved by Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in January 2016.
On Tuesday, March 8, 2016, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Shelley C. Chapman in New York permitted Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation to reject three gas gathering and handling agreements with Nordheim Eagle Ford Gathering, LLC and HPIP Gonzales Holdings, LLC. All of the agreements are governed by Texas law.
The mainstream media have been trying to predict, on almost a daily basis, the causes of, and the winners and losers (mostly focused on the latter category) resulting from, the current volatility in oil and gas prices.
The Bankruptcy Code provides certain protections to buyers of bankruptcy estate assets and to entities that extend credit or financing to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP"). However, these safe harbors are available only if a buyer or lender is deemed to have acted in "good faith," a concept that is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code.
A recent bankruptcy court decision denying a royalty owner's motion for summary judgment is highly relevant to any investor that currently owns a term royalty interest or is considering such an investment. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas found in NGP Capital Resources Co. v. ATP Oil & Gas Corp. (In re ATP Oil & Gas Corp.), No. 12-3443, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 33 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago has issued a decision with significant implications for licensees of trademarks whose licensors become debtors in bankruptcy. In Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, the Court considered whether rejection of a trademark license in bankruptcy deprives the licensee of the right to use the licensed mark.1 Disagreeing with the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v.
The Trustee overseeing the liquidation under the Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”) of Lehman Brothers Inc. (“Lehman”) in the U.S. and the Joint Administrator of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (“LB Europe”) in the U.K. have reached an agreement in principle to resolve $38 billion in asserted claims among Lehman, LB Europe and subsidiaries and affiliates. The agreement is subject to definitive documentation and approval by the Bankruptcy Court in New York and the English High Court. The parties set December 15, 2012 as the deadline to reach a final agreement.
In 1984, the Third Circuit was the first court of appeals to examine the Bankruptcy Code’s new definition of “claim” in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984). Focusing on the “right to payment” language in that definition, the court decided that a claim arises when a claimant’s right to payment accrues under applicable nonbankruptcy law. This “accrual” test was widely criticized by other circuit courts as contradicting the broad definition of “claim” envisioned by Congress and the Bankruptcy Code.
In the Summer 2009 issue of the Legal Canvas, we wrote about the wisdom of filing a UCC financing statement when art work is consigned to a gallery. Specifically, we said that the filing of a financing statement that reflects the consignor’s interest in the work provides protection against the gallery’s creditors. Financing statements take no time to prepare and cost less than $50 to file.
It could be money well spent.
In In re River East Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2012), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a bankruptcy court's ruling that a debtor could not "cram down" a chapter 11 plan over the objection of an undersecured creditor which had made a section 1111(b) election by substituting a lien on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds as the "indubitable equivalent" of the creditor's mortgage lien on the property.