The Bankruptcy Code provides certain protections to buyers of bankruptcy estate assets and to entities that extend credit or financing to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP"). However, these safe harbors are available only if a buyer or lender is deemed to have acted in "good faith," a concept that is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code.

A recent bankruptcy court decision denying a royalty owner's motion for summary judgment is highly relevant to any investor that currently owns a term royalty interest or is considering such an investment. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas found in NGP Capital Resources Co. v. ATP Oil & Gas Corp. (In re ATP Oil & Gas Corp.), No. 12-3443, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 33 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan.

In 1984, the Third Circuit was the first court of appeals to examine the Bankruptcy Code’s new definition of “claim” in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984). Focusing on the “right to payment” language in that definition, the court decided that a claim arises when a claimant’s right to payment accrues under applicable nonbankruptcy law. This “accrual” test was widely criticized by other circuit courts as contradicting the broad definition of “claim” envisioned by Congress and the Bankruptcy Code.

The U.S. Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2012 WL 1912197 (May 29, 2012), held that a debtor may not confirm a chapter 11 "cramdown" plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of existing liens, but does not permit a secured creditor to credit-bid at the sale. The unanimous ruling written by Justice Scalia (with Justice Kennedy recused) resolved a split among the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits.

In In re River East Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2012), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a bankruptcy court's ruling that a debtor could not "cram down" a chapter 11 plan over the objection of an undersecured creditor which had made a section 1111(b) election by substituting a lien on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds as the "indubitable equivalent" of the creditor's mortgage lien on the property.

On December 12, 2011, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari in a case raising the question of whether a debtor's chapter 11 plan is confirmable when it proposes an auction sale of a secured creditor's assets free and clear of liens without permitting that creditor to "credit bid" its claims but instead provides the creditor with the "indubitable equivalent" of its secured claim. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, No. 11-166 (cert. granted Dec. 12, 2011).

Earlier this year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided in In re Lett that objections to a bankruptcy court’s approval of a cram-down chapter 11 plan on the basis of noncompliance with the “absolute priority rule” may be raised for the first time on appeal. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that “[a] bankruptcy court has an independent obligation to ensure that a proposed plan complies with [the] absolute priority rule before ‘cramming’ that plan down upon dissenting creditor classes,” whether or not stakeholders “formally” object on that basis.

As part of the overhaul of bankruptcy laws in 1978, Congress for the first time included the definition of "claim" as part of the Bankruptcy Code. A few years later, in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), the Third Circuit became the first court of appeals to examine the scope of this new definition in the context of the automatic stay.